Washington,
DC, January 28, 2008 - As
Indonesia buries the ex-dictator Suharto, who died Sunday at the age of
86, the National Security Archive today posted a selection of
declassified U.S. documents detailing his record of repression and
corruption, and the long-standing U.S. support for his regime.
The
documents include transcripts of meetings with Presidents Richard M.
Nixon, Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, as well as Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, Vice-President Walter Mondale, then Vice-President
George W. Bush, and former Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Holbrooke.
Additional
documents detail U.S. perceptions of Suharto from the earliest years of
his violent rule, including the 1969 annexation of West Papua, the 1975
invasion of East Timor, and the so-called “Mysterious Killings” of
1983-1984.
“In death Suharto has escaped justice both in Indonesia and East Timor,” said Brad Simpson,
who directs the Archive's Indonesia and East Timor Documentation
Project. “But these declassified documents, detailing the long record
of U.S. support for one of the twentieth century’s most brutal and
corrupt men, will contribute to our understanding both of Suharto’s
rule and of the U.S. support which helped make it possible."
Most
of the documents posted today have been declassified as a result of
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed by the Archive, in
addition to documents unearthed in the National Archives (NARA) and
Presidential libraries.
In the coming weeks the
Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project will be posting
additional documents concerning the events leading up to Suharto’s
downfall in May 1998.
Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Initial Report on Suharto
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 55-68, December 31, 1968
Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 55-68. Secret
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxvi/4436.htm
This
National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA at the end of 1968
offers a positive portrait of Suharto and the New Order regime he had
assembled following his ouster of Sukarno in March 1966 and
consolidation of control in the intervening months. Just 18 months
after the bloody massacres involving the murder of between 500,000 and
one million alleged supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party, the
NIE states that “the Suharto government provides Indonesia with a
relatively moderate leadership.” The estimate reports, “There is no
force in Indonesia today that can effectively challenge the army's
position, notwithstanding the fact that the Suharto government uses a
fairly light hand in wielding the instruments of power. Over the next
three to five years, it is unlikely that any threat to the internal
security of Indonesia will develop that the military cannot contain;
the army--presumably led by Suharto--will almost certainly retain
control of the government during this period.”
Suharto's Meetings With U.S. Officials
Indonesia: Background - The West Irian Question, July 10, 1969
Subject: Djakarta Visit: Your Meetings with President Suharto, July 18, 1969
National
security adviser Henry Kissinger briefs President Nixon on his upcoming
visit to Indonesia and likely conversations with Indonesian President
Suharto. Kissinger argues that there is no U.S. interest in getting
involved in the issue of West Irian and that its people will choose
integration with Indonesia. In Nixon's talking points, Kissinger urges
that the President refrain from raising the issue except to note U.S.
sympathy with Indonesia's concerns.
Department of State, SECRET Memorandum from Henry Kissinger for the President, Subject: Your Meeting with President Suharto of Indonesia, May 26, 1970
Source: Richard M. Nixon Papers, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Box 2272
Suharto
made his first visit as head of state to the U.S. in May 1970. The trip
came amidst a major crackdown on political parties in Indonesia aimed
at insuring the dominance of the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups
(GOLKAR) and the Army in parliamentary elections scheduled for 1971, as
well as detailed revelations of pervasive corruption among government
and military officials including smuggling, bribery, kickbacks and
nepotism. Privately the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta warned that the
corruption and authoritarianism of the New Order would progressively
undermine its rule even as it eliminated or co-opted its opponents.
Publicly, however, the White House fairly gushed over the state of
relations with Jakarta and the Suharto regime’s performance, viewing
the trip as a chance to strengthen its already cozy ties with the
Indonesian dictator (who must have been surprised to learn that he
presided over one of the “largest democratic countries in the
world”). “There are no issues between the U.S. and Indonesia,”
Henry Kissinger wrote the President approvingly, “and relations are
excellent.” Suharto was offering to help support the U.S.-backed Lon
Nol government in Cambodia, the regime continued to welcome American
investors and pursue a “pragmatic” five year development plan, and
Indonesia was increasingly identifying with U.S. regional goals as the
Administration began its inexorable drawdown in South
Vietnam. “What Suharto has done and is doing accords perfectly
with your concept of Asian responsibilities under the Nixon Doctrine,”
the national security advisor observed.
Memorandum of Conversation, President Suharto of Indonesia, The President, Dr. Kissinger, May 26, 1970
Source: Richard M. Nixon Papers, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Box 2272
In
his meeting with President Nixon, Suharto frankly admits to having
“nullified the strength” of the Indonesian Communist Party, an apparent
reference to the mass killings of alleged PKI members, and states that
“tens of thousands” of its members “have been interrogated and placed
in detention.” President Nixon largely confines
himself to questions and supportive statements concerning U.S. support
for the Suharto regime. Over the course of Suharto’s two-day visit, the
White House reassures Indonesian officials of their continued
commitment to Southeast Asia and pledges to increase military aid to
$18 million to enable Indonesia to purchase 15,000 M-16 rifles to
replace the AK-47s it is covertly sending to Cambodia to assist the Lon
Nol government which recently overthrew the government of Prince
Sihanouk.
Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford, President Suharto, Dr. Kissinger, et al., July 5, 1975
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of
Conversations, Box 13, July 5, 1965 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian
President Suharto
This document records a conversation between Suharto and Ford at Camp
David on July 5, 1975, five months before the invasion of East Timor.
Speaking only a few months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in
South Vietnam, the two presidents shared a tour d'horizon of East Asian
political issues, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, international
investment, and Portuguese decolonization. Suharto brought up the
question of Portuguese decolonization in East Timor proclaiming his
support for “self-determination” but also dismissing independence as
unviable: “So the only way is to integrate [East Timor] into
Indonesia.” Ford gives no response.
U.S. Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, December 6, 1975 [Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto Discussion]
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel
File, Box A3, Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department
Telegrams 4/1/75-9/22/76
On
the eve of Indonesia’s full-scale invasion of East Timor, President
Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China
where they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. For more
than a year the U.S. had known that Indonesia was planning to forcibly
annex East Timor, having followed intelligence reports of armed attacks
by Indonesian forces for nearly two months. Thus, Ford or Kissinger
could not have been too surprised when, in the middle of a discussion
of guerrilla movements in Thailand and Malaysia, Suharto suddenly
brought up East Timor. “We want your understanding,” Suharto stated,
“if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.”
Ford
and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would not
oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: “We will understand and will
not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the
intentions you have.” Kissinger did indeed stress that “the use of
US-made arms could create problems,” but then added that, “It depends
on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign
operation.” Thus, Kissinger’s concern was not about whether U.S. arms
would be used offensively—and hence illegally—but whether the act would
actually be interpreted as such—a process he clearly intended
to manipulate. In any case, Kissinger added: “It is important that
whatever you do succeeds quickly.”
U.S. Embassy Telegram 4890 from Jakarta to Secretary of State, "Meeting with Suharto," April 18, 1977
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s visit to Jakarta in April 1977
and his lengthy meeting with President Suharto was the first by a
high-ranking Carter Administration official. The visit occurred
during the run-up to tightly-controlled Presidential and parliamentary
elections in which hundreds of Suharto opponents had been arrested and
critical newspapers shuttered. It thus represented, in the words
of the U.S. Embassy, an “unusual opportunity” to advance concerns about
human rights and democracy more generally - had that been Holbrooke’s
intention. In his meeting with Suharto, however, the Assistant
Secretary offered no criticism of Indonesia’s human rights record while
“acknowledging efforts President Suharto appeared to be making to
resolve Indonesian problems,” especially on East Timor, where he
“applauded” the President’s judgment in allowing Congressional members
to visit the territory but remained mute on reports of ongoing
atrocities. Suharto responded that Indonesia did “not seek to
hide anything” in East Timor – at a time when journalists and relief
organizations were banned and visitors allowed only under military
escort.
Memorandum for the President from the Vice President, "Visit to the Pacific," April 26, 1978
Source: NSA Staff Materials, Far East Files, Box 7, Carter Library
From
May 9 to May 10, 1978,Vice President Walter Mondale visited Indonesia
as part of a larger regional visit and the Carter Administration's
initiative to "deepen relations" with the Suharto regime. This Memo for
President Carter requested his approval for Mondale's policy goals for
the trip, including the expedited delivery of sixteen A-4 fighter jets
to Indonesia, which was then preparing for a massive campaign of aerial
bombardment of East Timor in an effort to crush armed resistance to its
occupation of the territory. Mondale's briefing memo makes no mention
of East Timor.
Telegram 12521 from Document: Telegram 6076 from Jakarta to State, "Summary of Vice President's Meeting with Suharto," May 10, 1978
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In
a May 10 meeting with Indonesian President Suharto, Mondale noted that
Indonesia's 1977 release of thousands of political detainees had
"helped create a favorable climate of opinion in the Congress" for
expanded American arms sales. He suggested to Suharto that releasing
prisoners more regularly would further improve public opinion and
deflect criticism - a suggestion the regime later implemented. The Vice
President likewise noted the two nations' "mutual concerns regarding
East Timor," in particular "how to handle public relations aspects of
the problem." As with the problem of political detainees, Mondale
suggested that allowing humanitarian groups such as Catholic Relief
Services access to East Timor would not only help refugees in the area
(overwhelmingly generated by Indonesian military operations) but "have
a beneficial impact on U.S. public opinion."
Issues and Objectives for the Suharto Visit, Undated
Memo from Kenneth Dam for the President, Subject: Your Meeting with Suharto, October 1, 1982
Summary of the President's Plenary Session with President Suharto of
the Republic of Indonesia, October 12, 1982
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In
October 1982 Suharto came to the U.S. on an official state visit, the
highest honor accorded visiting dignitaries. The briefing papers
and summary of Suharto’s plenary session with President Reagan are most
notable for what they do not contain – a single mention of human rights
in Indonesia or East Timor. The visit offers striking reminder of
the degree to which the Reagan Administration abandoned any high level
concern about human rights in Indonesia through the 1980s.
Telegram 14397 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, Subject: [Deleted] views on East Timor developments, September 9, 1983
Telegram 15303 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, Subject: Current Developments in East Timor, September 23, 1983
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In
August 1983 East Timorese guerrillas attacked Indonesian military
forces at the airport in Dili, killing 18 soldiers. In response to the
attack, and as part of a larger military offensive involving
10,000-12,000 troops, Indonesian soldiers carried out several large
massacres: of 200-300 civilians near the town of Viqueque, and at least
500 civilians in villages near Mount Bibileu. These two lengthy cables
describe those operations and the breakdown of the ceasefire which
preceded it, and fits a persistent pattern lasting from 1975 to 1999 in
which U.S. Embassy officials expressed skepticism over the scale or
even the existence of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor. In the
second cable, the embassy officer repeats the claim, apparently from an
Indonesian source (whose identity is excised), of several hundred
killed near Viqueque.
Department of State Briefing Paper – US-Indonesian Security Relations
Telegram 08201 from American Embassy Jakarta to State Department, Vice-President's Meeting with Soeharto, May 12, 1984
Source: Freedom of Information Act request
In
May, 1984 Vice President George H. W. Bush visited Indonesia as part of
a longer trip that included stops in Japan and South Asia. The briefing
papers prepared for Vice President Bush highlight the continued focus
on commercial and security relations over considerations of human
rights. In 1984 the U.S. provided $45 million in credits for
foreign military sales (FMS) and $2.5 million in International Military
and Educational Training (IMET), “our second largest IMET program
worldwide.” Vice-President Bush’s political scene setter notes
that “political activity in Indonesia is tightly controlled,” with “no
organized political activity” between national elections and opposition
forces “dispirited and incapable for the foreseeable future of mounting
a direct challenge to his power.”
Vice President
Bush’s visit came on the heels of a major Indonesian military offensive
in East Timor in which hundreds of civilians were massacred and in the
midst of a period of severe repression in Indonesia punctuated by “a
government-organized campaign of summary killings of alleged violent
criminals” known as the “mysterious killings,” which began in late 1982
and continued through 1984. The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta estimated
that the government had summarily executed about 4,000 people, with
continued killings reported.
In his meeting with
Suharto, however, Bush, like Reagan and previous high-ranking U.S.
officials, offered nothing but praise for the dictator, assuring him
that “our relations with Indonesia are most significant and that we
derived great satisfaction from our relations with Jakarta.” As
with Suharto’s 1982 visit to the U.S., there was no mention of human
rights, and discussion focused largely on U.S. relations with the
Soviet Union and China.
Suharto and Corruption
Memo from David Gunning from Peter Flanning, Weyerhauser Company – Indonesia Problems, December 5, 1972
Source: Nixon White House Central Files, Subject File, Country File Indonesia, Box 37
U.S.
officials were aware from the start of the deeply entrenched corruption
of the Suharto regime. This memorandum outlines the sort of
protection rackets the Suharto regime offered to foreign investors as
the cost of doing business in Indonesia. It details an
arrangement that the Weyerhaeuser Company (one of the world’s largest
timber companies) made with the Army for a timber concession in Borneo,
offering the Army “a 35% interest in the concession at no cost in order
to insure government cooperation.” Weyerhaeuser officials
express concern that “this arrangement has not provided the protection
which was expected” and that “disconnected actions by disparate army
officers and civil servants” in addition to the Army’s rake-off are
threatening the company’s profitable operations.
Embassy Jakarta Telegram 12910 to Secretary of State, Indonesian Miracle Beclouded: Proposal for Action at IGGI, December 14, 1972
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives
This
lengthy telegram describes the mounting concern with corruption voiced
by the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a donor consortium
established in 1967 to coordinate foreign aid to Indonesia. It
describes “increased, though fragmentary information of widespread and
growing corruption” and “the consensus of all informed observers that
scale is large and growing, that it involves highest echelons in
government, and that this in turn is causing it to spread and deepen in
all branches of social and economic life.”
Memo from Carleton Brower to the Ambassador, What Happened While You Were Away, August 10, 1973
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives
Memorandum from Ted Heavner to Mr. Hummel, Suharto's Involvement in Timber Concessions, September 7, 1973
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives
These
two memos describe Suharto’s personal intervention in a timber
concession in Kalimantan being sought after by the International Paper
Company. The head of IPC stated that “the matter was of the most
extreme sensitivity; that Suharto would brook no interference.” The
second memo describes how, after complex notions involving IPC and the
Indonesian government, “Suharto and his people were talking over the
entire concession for their own profit.”
In
unusually blunt language, the memo describes Suharto’s purported plan:
“three dummy corporations, one headed by his half-brother, one by his
son, and one by the notorious Bob Hasan group, will reportedly exploit
the concession. The memos seem to show that Suharto and his colleagues
in this enterprise are totally uninterested in proper timber management
or development of a wood processing industry and are intending only to
rape the concession for maximum short term profit.” [Note: The memos
summarized by these documents were not included in the lot file box at
the U.S. National Archives.]
