

# NATIONALISM, ISLAM AND MARXISM

SOEKARNO

Translated by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon

With an Introduction by Ruth T. McVey

## TRANSLATION SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project

Southeast Asia Program  
Cornell University  
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NATIONALISM, ISLAM, AND MARXISM:  
THE MANAGEMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN INDONESIA

In 1927, the year after Sukarno published the essay translated here, an analysis of political developments in the Netherlands East Indies appeared from the hand of M. W. F. Treub, political advisor to major Dutch economic interests in the colony and ideologue of the arch-conservative response to Indonesia's national awakening. It began as follows:

There is ferment in the Indies. Various movements among the native and Chinese population are mingling and seeking contact with each other. The one is impelled by the urge to independence, the other by religious zeal, a third by hatred for authority. The inner motives of the leaders differ fundamentally, but this need not and does not prevent them from working with each other for the achievement of one common goal: the overthrow of Netherlands rule.<sup>1</sup>

In this process, Treub declared, the "native movement" had become "a mélange of three tendencies and ambitions,"<sup>2</sup> which he defined as Nationalism, Communism, and Islam. He devoted the rest of his study to the exposition of the dangers presented by these ideological currents and the need to repress and, above all, to separate them.

The three ideological streams which Treub perceived were those which Sukarno also saw and which he made the subject of *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*. In choosing this common frame, the two showed that, however opposed their interests were, they both recognized the importance of the divisions which were one day to dominate Indonesian politics.

Circumstances favored their prescience, to be sure. Had they written a few years earlier, they might have found the Nationalist element in Indonesian politics so undefined as to

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1. M. W. F. Treub, Het gis in Indië (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1927), p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 13.

warrant a division of the independence movement into religious and secular parts rather than into three distinct streams; a few years later, and they might have found the Marxist element so thoroughly suppressed as a separate tendency as to merit consideration as a radical aspect of Nationalism rather than as an ideological current in itself. But the particular circumstances of 1926-1927--which saw a Communist-led uprising against colonial rule, the formation of the Indonesian National Party, and the bifurcation of organized Islam into traditionalist and modernist wings--gave prominence to the role of all three major divisions and made the question of their interrelationship a matter of active concern both for the leaders of the independence movement and for those who sought to destroy it. During the revolution of 1945-1949, with the removal of Dutch and Japanese colonial repression, these three ideological currents were to emerge as the principal orientations of the Republic's leaders and of the political movements which they headed.

#### Unity and the Elite

Sukarno's discussion of Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism, we should first observe, was aimed at his fellow leaders of the independence movement. He did not speak in this appeal to the frustrated rural and proletarian radicals who had set off the Communist rebellion the year before, nor to the pious *santri* champions of Islam, nor to the common folk in and near the cities who turned to his own Indonesian National Party (PNI) in their search for a point of orientation in a detraditionalized world. He saw well enough that these larger groups existed, but he viewed them here essentially as potential or actual clienteles of the metropolitan elite to which he addressed his appeal. This audience consisted roughly of those who shared the "metropolitan superculture"<sup>3</sup> that was then establishing itself as a modern pan-Indonesian way of life. A Western-style education was the usual basis for participation in this group, and as the opportunities to secure this were limited, it implied an advantaged social origin--most frequently descent from that part of the traditional bureaucratic elite that had been drawn into the colonial administrative service.<sup>4</sup>

3. I have taken the term and concept from Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), pp. 33-38.
4. For discussions of the origins and development of the Western-educated elite, see Robert Van Niel, The Emergence

In the 1920's, this national elite, while growing, was very small indeed; it centered naturally in the capital and formed a discernible social element elsewhere only in the relatively Europeanized cities of Bandung, Surabaya, and Medan. The new metropolitan culture was essentially mestizo, and its members displayed the ambivalence of those balancing psychologically between two worlds. Moreover, the culture contained the seeds of political rebellion, for colonial rule justified itself by its possession of modern administrative and technical expertise: those Indonesians who had been introduced into these Western mysteries and who also had traditional claims to a ruling position inevitably felt they could and should take the Europeans' place. Hence the new group formed a counter-elite; its members had a relatively high degree of political consciousness and, as a rising social class, they tended to view their position as one of upward struggle against the forces of ignorance and blind traditionalism on the one hand and those of alien power and prejudice on the other. This reinforced and politicized their cultural ambivalence: for on the one hand Indonesia's traditions and the mass of its people represented their most forceful support against alien domination, yet on the other prevented what they saw as a necessary leap into a modern future. Similarly, the Dutch represented both foreign oppression and a goal--in terms of modern culture and ruling position--which the members of the metropolitan elite sought to attain for themselves.

Sukarno's reference in *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism* was selective, even in terms of this emergent national elite. He was not speaking to the more conservative element: the questions of regionalism and cooperation with the colonial authorities, which so engaged the older and more cautious members of the Indonesian elite, were not raised here. Sukarno's essay was turned instead to the politically involved men of his own generation--young, committed to the struggle for independence, and already thinking of themselves overwhelmingly in terms of national rather than regional identity. In this small audience, he rightly saw the source of the country's future leadership; he also saw its weakness and the dissipation of its energies in continual quarrels, in which personal and ideological differences reinforced each other to fatal effect.

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of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague/Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1960), and Akira Nagazumi, "The Origin and Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1916" (Cornell University, Ph.D. diss., 1967). For some related views on the subject, see my "Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening," *Indonesia*, IV (October 1967), pp. 128-133.

To a leader inclined by temperament to seek mass strength rather than sectarian discipline, the marked disunity of the independence movement in 1926 was little short of disastrous. Even without the quarreling, "Indonesia" was little more than a project in the minds of a handful of men who had been liberated from the shackles of cultural parochialism and, by the same token, isolated from the main body of their society. This was the harder to bear because the proponents of national awakening had not always found their position so weak. A decade before, when the independence movement had appeared relatively united under the leadership of the Sarekat Islam, the Dutch had feared the power of that organization and had hesitated to move sharply against it; people had flocked to the movement, revealing thereby the vast energies that could be harnessed to the revolutionary cause if only they were given unified and purposeful leadership. But since that time, the forces of radical anticolonialism had lost their cohesion; unable to provide a convincing display of internal solidarity or popular support, they found their demands ignored and their leaders prey to harassment and arrest. By the time Sukarno wrote, the task of building a new solidarity within the movement seemed Sisyphean, for whenever some measure of agreement was reached in principle among the chief members, it collapsed on exposure to practice.

The unity of Indonesia's political leadership was generally appreciated to be of critical importance to the prosecution of the independence struggle, as is demonstrated by Treub's concern, from the colonialist side, to prevent its achievement. But for Sukarno and others of his generation and mind, the achievement of unity became even more than the key to political effectiveness. For them, frustration at continual discord in their own ranks combined with traditional political concepts and socialist borrowings to give "unity" a most particular interpretation. It acquired a quasi-magical value; only through unity could there be political strength--but once the People were united there was nothing they could not overcome. "People" here meant the entire mass of Indonesians, the mystical embodiment of all the nation. Sukarno and his fellows therefore rejected the intellectual's natural distrust of the common man as an opponent of modernist enlightenment and instead argued that the folk possessed a progressive general will which would respond to those who summoned it in the name of freedom and the future. The *Rakjat*--the People--became the messianic equivalent of Marx's proletariat, deprived and powerless now, but destined to change the world when mobilized in the revolutionary cause.<sup>5</sup>

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5. For a discussion of the concept of the *Rakjat* and an illustration of the difference between the Indonesian

Unlike the class-defined proletarian, however, the People represented a general mass, both undifferentiated as against the ruling elite and at the same time divided within itself into myriad linguistic, religious, cultural, and economic groupings which coalesced on broad lines of ideological identification. Nationalists of Sukarno's type believed the unification of society was to be accomplished by amalgamating these components rather than, in the Leninist manner, by excluding incompatible elements from a coherent core. Union would occur most completely at the top of the hierarchy; in the Sukarnoist vision of the 1920's, it was to be achieved among the politically active members of the emergent national elite, who, fired by their vision of a common Indonesian purpose, would both represent the major forces within the society and channel their energies to the service of the national cause. It was to convince Indonesia's prospective political leadership of the need to assume this role that Sukarno wrote *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*.

This emphasis on the persuasion of the elite remained characteristic of Sukarno's political activity in later years in spite of his role as mass leader. There was, in fact, a fundamental ambiguity in Sukarno's political style, one that has been fairly characteristic of the populist leaders of newly independent countries and which probably springs from similar contradictions between revolutionary commitment and social conservatism. As supreme leader in the Guided Democracy period, Sukarno was to stress his role as the Voice of the People<sup>6</sup> and to encourage the image of a spiritual union between himself and the Rakjat arching over a degenerate and self-seeking elite. But this union was never given substance:

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romantic nationalist view of the common man and the Marxist idea of the proletariat, see Sukarno, *Marhaen and Proletarian* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), a translation by Claire Holt of a speech given by Sukarno to a PNI congress in 1957.

6. One of his titles, Penjambung Lidah Rakjat, literally means "Extension of the People's Tongue." When used in the mystical-political sense, the word rakjat was commonly capitalized, and I have followed this practice in referring to the "people," in this meaning, to indicate the extra dimension. This concept of Rakjat (which is not its original meaning--it derives from an Arabic word meaning "subject") is somewhat similar in resonance to the German romantic nationalist notion of Volk, though the difference between Indonesian and German worlds of thought is such that one cannot press the analogy far.



neither through organization nor through an appeal for mass action was the People called on to move against the supporters of a corrupted status quo in the name of the Leader and the Revolution. The support of the People, in spite of its vast symbolic importance and its political potential, was used by Sukarno in practice as a lever for dealings which remained within the intimate sphere of capital politics and which aimed at balancing off and pacifying rival leaders and factions--the symbols of the larger forces in society rather than those forces themselves. In part, this was the result of long habit and the relative practical helplessness of a leader who had never created an effective *apparatus* of his own. But it also reflected more conscious considerations--above all, the feeling that a social breakdown and chaos could only be prevented by the negotiation of communal differences, and that for this a cohesive, representative, and authoritative elite was necessary.

This reasoning reflects a view of Indonesia as possessing an identifiable and relatively homogeneous political elite. It was a vision which may have derived in part from the traditional two-class division of society into ruling hierarchy and subject mass; in part from the relative homogeneity and isolation of the colonial metropolitan counter-elite, so many of whose members later filled the upper ranks of Indonesia's national leadership; and in part, I suspect, from observation of the Netherlands experience, which I shall discuss later. In fact, however, twentieth-century Indonesia did not possess a ruling class--the Dutch aside--that was cohesive and authoritative enough to provide a basis for this kind of control.

The social-political group that derived from the metropolitan superculture and peopled the post-Independence nationalist leadership was homogeneous enough, in spite of its factional quarrels, but this coherence derived in good part from its isolation and its ambivalent relationship to the larger society. In one sense it was a pioneering element, the spearhead of a change which would inexorably involve all of Indonesian society; but in another it was a hybrid, born of a brief and violent relationship between European and Indonesian cultures, insufficiently rooted in the general society. In the colonial period, the presence of a clear, alien opponent to all but the most "feudal" elements in Indonesia provided it with a clear leadership role, but the decay of national governmental authority after the revolution reflected its weakness in the role of ruling class. It suffered both from its members' own ambivalence toward the larger society and from the feeling of large portions of the provincial public that those in Djakarta represented them feebly or not at all. War and revolution had shaken broad layers



of the society and brought them, however briefly, into political action; new sources of leadership appeared, more local and less Westernized, forming new counter-elites that challenged the authority of the postcolonial national Establishment.

In the first years after the revolution, Djakarta's political leaders argued the matter of holding elections: they were anxious on the one hand to put down deeper roots into the society, to establish a real relationship with the mass clientele they claimed to represent, and to link to themselves those lower-level leaders who might otherwise compete for the loyalties of the mass; at the same time, they were unsure of the extent of their public support, uncertain of how to go about securing it, and uncomfortable with the idea of sharing power with leaders who did not come from their own cultural milieu. The holding of the 1955 general elections was in this sense something of an act of desperation, in which elite hesitation was overcome by an even greater alarm at political stagnation and a rapid decline in the Djakarta leadership's authority. The elections did not provide clarity but did demonstrate growing support for a movement that was essentially anti-Establishment through the strong showing made by the PKI--Communist Party--in the 1955 vote and by the rapid rise in its strength in the 1957-1958 regional elections. They were thus a failure from Djakarta's point of view in spite of their contribution to identifying and organizing mass clienteles for the various factions of the national elite. Perhaps, if the economic situation had been easier or if independence had been achieved without a disruptive war, the metropolitan elite that dominated post-revolutionary politics would have been able to consolidate and institutionalize its power; but as it was, the mid-1950's saw its authority ebbing by the day. In the regions, locally-based leaderships challenged its right to command, while at the center it was threatened by two rising hierarchies, the army and the Communist party.

In this situation, Sukarno moved in a direction that was at once radical and conservative. He sought to neutralize the two new contenders by establishing a stalemate between them, and he also attempted to revive the nation's sense of unity and momentum by assuming a greater role as leader and by reviving the symbols of the revolution. In the process, the parliamentary system was abandoned, but not the dominant role of the metropolitan elite. On the contrary, that group's political position was assured by the absence of elections during Guided Democracy. The creation of a plethora of officially-sponsored fronts increased its sphere of formal activity and membership but did not change its essential character, and the widely-publicized "retoolings" of politically unmal-

able individuals produced only a mild reshuffling of the bureaucratic deck.

This preservation of the position of the national elite was in good part the purpose of Guided Democracy. The system can be seen in a sense as an effort by Sukarno to rescue that elite from an otherwise imminent loss of its power to regional, Communist, or military counter-elites. All of the latter were too particularistic to play a consensual role; they could only dominate the country through the application of force, through the dispersion of central power, or through social upheaval. This fact, together with Sukarno's natural affinity for the cultural and political group from which he himself derived, led him to attempt to shore up the waning authority of the metropolitan elite by providing a new, populist setting for its rule and by working to neutralize and absorb the leading elements among the counter-elite contenders.

From this point of view, the flaw in the Guided Democracy effort lay in the fact that the measures taken to preserve the cohesion and authority of the metropolitan elite also protected it from the need to root itself more firmly in the society as a whole. In the absence of elections, it was only natural that the always tenuous and ambivalent relationship between the national elite and its mass clientele would decay and that the distance between central and local leaderships would grow greater. Djakarta leaders came to represent groups in the society at large not because of any demonstrated ability to move them but because it was proclaimed--at the center, and ultimately by Sukarno--that this or that leader spoke for this or that segment of the population.

In the latter years of Guided Democracy, this led to an entourage politics which in some ways resembled the palace politics of traditional Java.<sup>7</sup> Sukarno assumed more and more openly the classical role of the ruler, who was conceived as drawing strength from the fact that he could fuse in his own person the forces contending among his people, concentrating them into a focused energy that was much more than the sum of its kinetic parts.<sup>8</sup> This extreme development served to

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7. For ideas concerning the resemblance of latter-day Guided Democracy to Javanese court politics, I am indebted to conversations with Professor G. J. Resink in Djakarta, 1964-1965.

8. For a discussion of traditional Javanese ideas of power and unity, see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture

illuminate some of the traditional elements that had gone into radical nationalist thinking--most notably, for our purpose, the older source of the idea of unity as all-inclusive and dynamic. The fact that unity was conceived as necessarily inclusive and as the essential source of social energy probably helps to explain Sukarno's great reluctance to break completely with any element of his entourage. Only for reasons of extreme pique did he permanently exclude any member of the "in" group of national politicians from his councils, and no faction, once recognized, was completely denied a voice. His preferred reaction to changing times was not to exclude the old or disfavored but rather to coopt and give prominence to the new--making it a part of the entourage, which thereby changed in mood if not in fundamental substance.

There is some reason to think that as Indonesia's social and economic crisis deepened, Sukarno realized the limits of a leadership oriented toward securing the consensus of the elite and that his increasing attention to the Communist Party in the final year of Guided Democracy represented an attempt to find a more dynamic alternative even at the possible cost of social upheaval. If so, it is likely he thought of this essentially in terms of a post-Sukarno era, when there would be no ruler capable of containing all Indonesia's diverse elements within himself and when, therefore, the country's leadership would have to be based on less inclusive sources of power. In any event, he showed himself unable to abandon his accustomed style when the crisis came in his own lifetime: confronted in the immediate postcoup period with the need to decide whether to stake all on an appeal beyond the national elite to his mass following or to try to recoup his fortunes by maneuvering the familiar entourage, he persevered in the latter course, with results fatal to his rule.

#### Aliran

In the light of Sukarno's ultimate reliance on the upper crust of national life, it is not surprising to observe that the idea of class struggle was missing from his vision of Indonesian politics, as it was for so many other radical nationalists who otherwise borrowed heavily from Marx. As members of an aspiring elite, linked by ties of family and cultural background to traditional officialdom and by reason of education and ambition to Dutch colonial style, such

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and Politics in Indonesia (forthcoming), which the author graciously allowed me to see in manuscript form.

leaders had little interest in promoting an overturn that would go much farther than replacing Netherlands rule with their own. Moreover, the idea of a conflict of interest between ruler and ruled went against the grain of older political thought. For in this view the leader was able to unite disparate social forces within himself, mobilizing their energies and holding them in balance, because he was at the same time above these forces and the incarnation of all of them, standing for no single interest himself. Consequently, the idea of permanent vertical cleavages in the society, capable of arbitration at the top, could be accepted as natural at the same time that class division, in which the ruler played a necessarily one-sided role, was rejected as a concept suitable for the West but disruptive and dangerous in the Indonesian context.

For Sukarno to have adopted the Marxist concept of class struggle would have meant to deny the general representative and ameliorative role of the metropolitan elite and thus of the post-revolutionary ruling class. This elite served not only as the chief executor of public policy--the vital first link in the chain downward between leader and mass--but also as the representative and pacifying agent of the vertical cleavages in the society.<sup>9</sup> These larger divisions included a rich variety of religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional differentiations; but the principal cleavages, in terms of which nearly all the others had to operate politically, were the Javanese divisions between *prijaji* high culture, *abangan* folk culture, and *santri* pious Islam. As soon as the revolution extended politics beyond the narrow confines of the Western-educated elite and the constructions of a colonial environment, these cleavages assumed a dominant public place, becoming ideologically incarnate as the three streams of Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. This attachment of mass loyalties to modern centrally-led parties on the basis of pre-existing patterns of social and cultural cleavage provided the political groupings in the capital with a vital link to the larger society; but at the same time, it set limits to the parties' appeal and colored their modes of public action. Eventually, these cultural-ideological

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9. This fits with the traditional role of the bureaucratic elite, for the good official was seen as being a father to the people placed in his care, balancing conflicting social elements against each other and thus, by providing each group with its allotted part and no more, preserving the general harmony. See Donald Fagg, "Authority and Social Structure: a Study of Javanese Bureaucracy" (Harvard University, Ph.D. diss., 1958), especially pp. 379-382.

divisions were to win formal recognition in the ill-fated NASAKOM union of Nationalist, Religious, and Communist forces urged in the period of Guided Democracy.<sup>10</sup>

The mass clientele of the Islamic political leaders was present from the start in the modernist and traditionalist santri communities. The clienteles of the Nationalist and Communist politicians were not so immediately available, and the process by which links were forged between those ideologies and mass followings is one that still needs investigation. There is, however, a broad social correspondence in these attachments, in that the abangan, as the peasant variant of traditional Javanese culture, found political representation in the Communist party, whose counter-elite leadership implied an attack on the status quo at the same time that it participated in Djakarta politics; while the prijaji, the bearers of the high culture, found a socially more conservative reflection for their outlook in the Nationalism of the PNI. Indeed, all three streams reflect different economic as well as cultural orientations, for the commercial attachment of the santri gave that group a very different set of interests from the bureaucratic prijaji, which in turn looked on the abangan not only as its bucolic cultural relative but also as a peasant class that must be kept in its place. Clashes of interest could thus very easily be translated into cultural terms and in the process become emotionally deepened and generalized.<sup>11</sup>

10. For an analysis of the setting of Guided Democracy politics, see Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," World Politics, XVI, 1 (October, 1963), pp. 79-97. For an elaboration of the NASAKOM idea, see Sukarno, Nasakom Bersatu--Nasakom Djiwaku! (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1965), a speech to the Peasants' Conference of July 20, 1965. The title--United in Nasakom, Nasakom My Soul!--was a slogan of the time and the title of one of the official songs taught to schoolchildren as part of their ideological upbringing.
11. For a study of interaction between the aliran in one setting, see Robert Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1963). For a general discussion of prijaji, abangan and santri values, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). Geertz' The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 153-208, provides a detailed study of the relationship between political parties, interest groups, and cultural orientation at the village level in an election in post-Independence Java.



In spite of general agreement on the broad definition of the prijaji-abangan-santri division, it is in practice extremely difficult to state the content of the Indonesian *aliran*--"streams" or "currents" of fundamental allegiance--beyond these crude cultural-political *cum* economic identifications. This is partly because the boundaries of the aliran allegiances have shifted and settled over time, and partly because the ideological labels attached to them are generally used loosely to refer to several different and not entirely overlapping types of cleavage. We thus observe them rather as images in a bad mirror--clearly present, but with perversely altering forms.

Seen from one political angle, the aliran divisions apply to an ongoing ideological argument in national politics--essentially a debate among factions of the Djakarta elite. From another, they refer to the political expression of vertical cleavages in the wider Indonesian society, based on cultural variation. Finally, they apply as well to horizontal social divisions reflecting class differences. Sometimes these aspects connect with and reinforce each other, but they do not necessarily do so; and hence the aliran change their scope and quality according to the context in which they are being discussed.

In this manner, the Marxist label (as used in Sukarno's essay; or Communist, in terms of Treub's analysis and the NASAKOM triad) has a certain meaning when attached to one party in the debate among national political strategists; it has a different quality when applied to the political expression of the third element in the cleavage between santri, prijaji, and abangan in Javanese society; and it has still another significance when it connotes the politically aroused urban and rural poor as against merchant, landowner, and bureaucratic interests. In the first incarnation, "Communism" appears as the factional allegiance of a leadership operating in the context of a metropolitan elite into which its hierarchs had been partially adopted. In the second, it appears as the expression of communal sentiment in a highly deferential and conservative folk culture. In the third, it becomes a movement of class struggle, led by a hierarchy essentially outside of and opposed to the national elite.

Similar shifts occur when the Nationalist label is applied to the prijaji cultural group or to "feudal" or bureaucratic interests; and when Islam is taken to denote elite politicians who appeal to a religious clientele, or to refer to the santri cultural community, or to encompass the commercial and landowning interests commonly identified with pious adherence to the faith. Indeed, the case of Islam is complicated by the fact that it is itself divided into two

wings, representing, like the major aliran divisions, a difference in both philosophical orientation and social role.<sup>12</sup> One is the *kolot* (old-fashioned) style, which represents the rural conservatism of an Islam long exposed to the influence of pre-Muslim culture. The second is the *modèren* (modern) mode, which was inspired by the Muslim reform movement of the nineteenth-century Near East and aimed at meeting the challenge of European hegemony by theological purification and by the modernization of social and economic practice. The pattern of adherence to these styles differs greatly from one area to the next, and reflects above all the historical course of the penetration into the archipelago first of Islam itself and then of attempts to renew it.

We must bear in mind that the *kolot* and *modèren* styles appear in several incarnations--theological, social, and political--and that these represent overlapping but not completely identical groups of people. Politically, the *kolot* position is represented archetypically by the Nahdatul Ulama Party, the leading element of which has consisted of the moneylenders and landholders of hinterland Java, together with traditionalist religious teachers and scholars. Hence, the *kolot* position has come to be identified with rural and small-town wealth as well as with theological conservatism, though in fact the overwhelming majority of those who adhere to it are poor and a considerable number are urban. Similarly, the *modèren* position has been most visible socially as the "Protestant ethic" of an emergent urban entrepreneurial class. This image was stamped on the Masjumi party of the 1950's, even though that group drew its greatest popular strength from anti-Javanese sentiment rather than from theologically or socially *modèren* enthusiasm.<sup>13</sup>

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12. There was, in fact, some tendency to refer to the aliran division as a quadripartite one, particularly in the late 1950's, when the Masjumi-Nahdatul Ulama relationship was of crucial political importance and when it was therefore useful (at least from the secularist viewpoint) to avoid treating Islam as a single entity. Thus, Sukarno used the metaphor of the "four-legged horse" in urging the inclusion of the Communists in the government in his initial call for Guided Democracy rather than the original Nationalism-Islam-Marxism trinity or the later NASAKOM. See Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1966), pp. 16-17.
  13. It should be borne in mind that the contrast described here is essentially a Javanese one: outside the ethnic Javanese area the Masjumi appealed, for a variety of

Neither of these santri wings has been able to achieve cultural dominance over its fellow. Moreover, the concern of Islam with doctrinal correctness has made the theological differences between them loom large. Consequently, religious contrasts between the two branches have found easy articulation, and their organized cooperation has been difficult. But this division has not been of the same emotional order as that separating the santri from the non-santri cultural communities.<sup>14</sup> Though the members of the latter may be *Islam statistik* (nominal Muslims) they see militant Islam of both branches as a danger, an aggression against their accustomed way of life; and its advance threatens to rob them of their identity. On the other hand, to the devout Muslims, the abangan-prijaji cultural mode appears as heathen at heart, a style which, though it has long claimed surrender to Islam, has yet persisted in dominating Indonesia politically and socially, preventing Islam and the groups identified with it from finding their rightful place in the sun.

In reality, the prijaji-santri-abangan triad is based on two divisions of a different order. In cultural terms, the main schism has been between Islam and the prijaji-abangan "Javanese religion,"<sup>15</sup> which incorporated pre-Islamic

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reasons, to a broader clientele, while the Nahdatul Ulama's place was taken by various other Muslim parties. For a description of kolot-modèren and Masjumi-Nahdatul Ulama rivalries in one Javanese area, see Lance Castles, *Religion, Politics, and Economic Behavior in Java* (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1967), pp. 61-68.

14. This is not disproved by the fact that during the parliamentary period the Nahdatul Ulama found it easier to ally with the Nationalist PNI than with the Masjumi party. On the contrary, as politicians, the NU leaders felt particularly threatened by the Masjumi because they were competing with it for broadly the same clientele; they were aware that they possessed less in the way of organizational and leadership skills than the Masjumi leaders and that the historical drift within the santri community was from kolot to modèren adherence. Hence they saw the preservation of distance as necessary to their continued political power.
15. Agama Djawa, the Javanese religion, is one of the terms used to refer to this world view. Its adherents are nominal Muslims but are commonly considered heathen by orthodox santri and themselves refer to Islam, when considering it in its santri form, as an alien force.



thought and represented the rural and court culture of interior Java in defense against the historically advancing power of Islam. From this point of view, Javanese society divides into two and not three cultural parts; and indeed, a bifurcation into Santri and Abangan--the latter being understood to incorporate both high and folk variants of the "Javanese religion"--is frequently used in Java to refer to its basic cultural schism.<sup>16</sup> The Abangan grouping can then be seen as composed of two subdivisions, prijaji and abangan proper, much as the Santri consists of kolot and modèren modes.

But the prijaji-abangan relationship is as much one of two classes as it is one of cultural variants. It thus has a dimension which the kolot-modèren contrast does not possess, for though the intra-santri dichotomy involves groups with different orientations towards economic activity, both wings are led by a moneyed and commercially active class--rural landholders and usurers on the one and urban traders and entrepreneurs on the other. The division within the Abangan, on the other hand, represents the contrast between elite and mass, between prijaji as ruling class and abangan as populace. This division is easily as deep as that between Santri and Abangan, but it has been largely inarticulate. In contrast to the doctrinal exclusiveness of Islam, the older "Javanese religion" is highly syncretic and provides little opportunity for schism; on the contrary, it places very great value on the absorption of deviant thought. Moreover, the prijaji bearers of the Javanese high culture, who were naturally uninterested in aiding the formulation of a subversive viewpoint, achieved such an ideological domination of the larger Abangan cultural grouping that no anti-Establishment position developed, save on the local level, until the quite recent penetration of Communist ideas.<sup>17</sup>

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16. The usual criticism of Geertz' study of The Religion of Java that I have heard from Javanese was that it treated prijaji and abangan as two distinct cultural entities instead of subsuming them into one larger Abangan grouping. Actually, Geertz does point out the close relationship between the two; but because his study is sociological rather than theological and is much concerned with the political and economic expression of aliran affinities, he comes in the end to a de facto reliance on the tripartite prijaji-abangan-santri division, as many Indonesians do in referring to the political expression of Indonesian social relationships.
  17. We might see the elements of such a tradition, however, in the role of the punakawan clowns of the wayang plays,

It is possible that one reason why popular resentment was not more readily directed at the traditional ruling class is that it could be turned against other, more clearly alien exploiting groups--the foreign colonizers and the santri and Chinese merchant-moneylenders. The priajaji, of course, were open servants of the Dutch in colonial days; nonetheless, their position as collaborators was ambivalent, for they also represented a defeated indigenous leadership, which served unwillingly and which embodied a local culture and sense of identity opposed to the Dutch. This ambivalence was preserved with the rise of nationalism, for the priajaji split politically, its lower ranks--participants in the new metropolitan superculture--providing a major source of recruits to the independence movement. On the one hand, these members of the emergent national elite took pride in their birth and cherished older ideas as legitimation for their claims to rule; on the other hand, they condemned traditional attitudes as "feudal" and welcomed commoners as brothers-in-arms. By and large, those of the populace with enough education and initiative to become politically active entered into the broader but still priajaji-dominated world of the independence movement. They were drawn to the towns, to the new culture, and to the chance of being taken up into a metamorphosed ruling class. As a result, those who formulated grievances were little inclined to make the indigenous elite a principal object of their attack, and they found ample targets in the alien exploiting groups. Even the post-revolutionary Communists, who among the major political groupings came closest to speaking for the common folk, talked and acted in terms of the elite, according it equivocal status in their ideology by declaring that it contained progressive as well as reactionary elements.<sup>18</sup>

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and in the ideas of some of the Javanese rural mystical groups. For a discussion of one of the better-known of the latter, see Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, "The Samin Movement," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 125, 2 (1969), pp. 207-240. Studies of the development of the punakawan roles and of rural mystical movements in the course of the past century might aid greatly in determining the course and extent of Javanese peasant alienation from the priajaji-dominated tradition.

18. The failure of the political activists to stress social revolutionary themes does not necessarily reflect an absence of such sentiment among the populace. During the revolution, local breakdowns of order were accompanied by violence directed against the traditional elites in various areas, most notably in the "social revolutions" of Atjeh and East Sumatra, where there was a slaughter

One result of the inarticulateness of prijaji-abangan differences is that when conflict between the two did occur it was perceived as culturally unnatural and therefore the result of abnormal behavior. Indignation at such deviation from proper conduct gave way rather easily, once normalcy was restored, to a concern for uniting forces against the more "natural" enemy of militant Islam. This seems a principal reason why the Communist party was able to recover so quickly from its defeat in the Madiun Affair of 1948. That conflict with government forces became, at the local level, a clash between santri and abangan communities, and this helped prijaji officials to perceive the PKI position more tolerantly than they otherwise would. Moreover, it encouraged the prijaji-led PNI to see in the Communists an anti-santri ally, which it felt need of in its early post-revolutionary rivalry with the Masjumi. It was thus psychologically easy and politically convenient for the Nationalists to label the Affair a "tragic event" and refuse to apportion blame further, in spite of their anti-PKI stand at the time of the clash itself.

Similarly, Nationalist leaders in Central and East Java who were active in the anti-Communist campaign following the October 1965 coup tended to change their position to a protective one as it appeared that the Communists' abangan clientele was not about to undertake class warfare and that it was suffering a massive santri attack. However, this time there was no rehabilitation of the PKI but, on the contrary, a banning also of the Rakjat-oriented left wing of the PNI. This seems to reflect both the lessening importance of political parties and mass clienteles and an increasing weight of class as against aliran considerations in the calculations of those in authority. For already in the period immediately following the revolution, the perceived difference between prijaji and abangan social groups had become sufficiently great to give prijaji, abangan, and santri equal

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of the old ruling class. The "Tiga Daerah" Affair was the most prominent incident to arise from these sentiments in Java. The whole pemuda (youth) involvement in the early revolution was suffused with social revolutionary impulse, and a principal concern of the Republic's leaders was how to keep such emotions in check. See Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution" (Cornell University, Ph.D. diss., 1967), pp. 499-539 and passim. Whether such feeling was widespread or deep enough to fuel a successful social revolution in Java or across the nation is another matter; the point is that political activists of any education and extra-local experience did not find it worthwhile to take up the theme.

weight as ideological-political orientations alongside the historical santri-abangan cultural cleavage. As we shall see, powerful forces in the post-revolutionary period militated against continuing abangan acceptance of priajati leadership and increased a general consciousness of diverging interests between mass and elite.

### Verzuiling

The effect of elemental allegiances cutting across the ties based on the calculation of material interest has been the subject of much theoretical comment.<sup>19</sup> Commonly, these loyalties have been conceived as forming vertical cleavages which bisect the horizontal divisions based on class--an image which I have also used here. Human nature is not so geometrically orderly, however, and in real life such relationships are infinitely more complex. It is quite possible, therefore, for "primordial" loyalties to lie in such a relationship to divisions of interest that their overall effect is to deepen rather than to break across the lines of material strain in the society.

This is the case in the Netherlands, for example. The population of that country is sharply divided ideologically between Catholic, Protestant, and secular loyalties. The relationship of these "vertical" cleavages to the divisions based on interest had such a resonance within Dutch society that the country's stability was endangered once the extension of the franchise made possible the political articulation and mobilization of mass sentiment. The eventual solution was an arrangement known as *versuiling*.<sup>20</sup> In its

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19. The most useful of these for our purpose is Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157. The term "primordial loyalties," which I have used, is his. We should bear in mind, however, that aliran-based communalism differs from that based on language, ethnic, and regional distinctions in that it is purely ideological and hence less fixed. Moreover, it occurs within the same formal religion, so that it is not limited by professed faith.
  20. For a good discussion of Dutch politics and the verzuiling phenomenon, see Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California, 1968). A comparison between the Indonesian aliran and the Dutch zuilen has

extreme formulation, this envisaged the three ideological communities as pillars united only at the top by a self-conscious elite whose members would not allow their communal commitments to overshadow their role as preservers of the general peace. Friction was avoided in this system by reducing inter-aliran contact to a minimum at the mass level and by adhering to strict equity in parceling out patronage and power among the communities via their representatives in the elite. The object was to pacify but not in the first instance to overcome popular ideological differences--indeed, the obliteration of contrasts was not necessarily seen as desirable by the communal leaders, whose power rested in the end on their existence.

The Dutch system--now beginning to erode under the homogenizing and secularizing impact of industrialization--is of interest to the Indonesian experience for two reasons. First of all, since the Netherlands was the Western democratic model presented to Indonesians in the colonial period, much of the Dutch approach to politics was absorbed by the Indonesian nationalists even as they reacted against colonial rule and European ways. Quite likely, the Dutch example also helped prevent any inclination on the nationalists' part to question the validity of aliran orientation in a modern Indonesia. Finally, the Dutch solution to the problem of

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been made earlier, in Basuki Gunawan and O. D. van den Muijzenberg, "Verzuilingstendenties en sociale stratificatie in Indonesië," *Sociologische Gids*, XIV, 3 (May-June 1967), pp. 145-158. W. F. Wertheim, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java" (Mimeo; paper prepared for the International Conference on Asian History, Kuala Lumpur, August 1968), has criticized this on the grounds that "it is dangerous to draw sociological parallels between a pre-industrial and a highly industrialized society" (p. 7), and he suggests an approach based on patron-client relationships. It seems to me that, while patronage relations are very important in Indonesia, as in most pre-industrial countries, they do not explain the aliran phenomenon. For the reasons given above in the text, I think a comparison with verzuiling continues to be useful, provided one is well aware that Dutch and Indonesian societies are in very many ways quite dissimilar. The Netherlands is, of course, not the only other country where such a phenomenon occurs--we might take Austria or for that matter Malaysia, where the existence of political-economic-cultural competition between the major ethnic groups was codified and (at least until early 1969) managed in a verzuiling-type arrangement.



ideological communalism resembles in certain respects the approach outlined in Sukarno's 1926 essay and later attempted in the NASAKOM formulation. If we look more closely at the Indonesian effort in the light of the Dutch experience, we may be able to gain a clearer notion of the assumptions underlying Sukarno's reasoning and, at the same time, to discern some of the weaknesses that were to prove fatal to the attempts to implement it.

The management of aliran conflict as it was undertaken in the Netherlands required a relatively homogeneous and self-conscious ruling group and also mass clientele which were sufficiently contented and loyal to their elite spokesmen that they were willing to give those leaders considerable leeway in bargaining on matters of communal interest. These were quite special conditions, and they demanded considerable social and economic resources to be able to maintain equilibrium even under conditions of relatively gradual change.

In a limited sense, the first of these requirements was met in Indonesia. The Western-educated priajati, and thus the Nationalist stream, set the style for the independence movement and then for the politics of postrevolutionary Jakarta; by and large those who represented the other two aliran in national politics were themselves of priajati or equivalent origin or had adapted to the metropolitan version of that mode. But the fact that the governing style was closely identified with one aliran meant that the others were never really satisfied that they were being given equal consideration in public affairs--as indeed they often were not. This meant that in times when the Nationalist aliran was in a politically vulnerable position (as against Communism in the immediate pre-coup period and Islam thereafter), leaders from other aliran were easily able to arouse their mass followings and use the threat of civil violence to support their efforts for a more favorable political arrangement. But because of the strong hold of the priajati on the bureaucracy and the modern priajati mode of the whole of the metropolitan elite, this did not in fact result in more than superficial changes in the style at the top, no matter how extreme the aliran resentments expressed at the mass level. The end result maintained the general cultural homogeneity of the elite (if not the unity of its individual members) while exacerbating mass communal tensions, contributing neither to the general pacification of communal differences nor to the maintenance of the mass clientele's confidence in their elite spokesmen.

In a broader sense, the Indonesian ruling elite was homogeneous at the cost of being representative, for (in contrast to Dutch cultural uniformity outside the ideological

divisions) Indonesian society was highly heterogeneous in its culture. The aliran division was, after all, based on Javanese contrasts; non-Javanese social divisions were expressed in these terms only because of Java's weight in national politics and culture. "Vertical" divisions existed outside Java, sometimes quite analogous to those of the Javanese aliran, but the alignment of Outer Island communities in national politics depended more on their leaders' calculations of interest and advantage than on any real aliran ties to the national parties. The strongest bonds thus tended to be based on the "horizontal"--i.e., class--aspect of the national parties' appeal, with bureaucratic and administrative elements looking to the Nationalist PNI, urban and plantation workers and politically aroused poorer peasants turning to the Communist PKI, and commercial and moneyed interests gravitating to the Masjumi or the rural NU. Under Guided Democracy, the Masjumi's initial domination of Outer Island political activity declined with the banning of the party's legal activities, the growing PNI hold on the non-Java bureaucracy, and the PKI's industrious proselytization of the lower classes; in the same period, the PNI and PKI became less entirely Javanese organizations and thus less capable of undertaking the settlement of their differences on a Java-oriented verzuiling basis. Economic decline in Java itself added to this pressure for a more "horizontal," class-oriented content to the parties, as people became increasingly concerned to protect their economic positions. Thus, although the overt trend of Guided Democracy politics was towards increasing Javanization and NASAKOM-based verzuiling, strong pressures developed underneath in quite the opposite direction. The tension between the public and the covert but massive tendencies of Indonesian politics in this period may help to explain some of the violence of the swing away from the Guided Democracy system accompanying Sukarno's fall.

Indonesia did not possess the strong ties between elite leadership and mass clientele which were important to the maintenance of the verzuiling system in the Netherlands. Tension resulted in the first place from the vast difference between Indonesia's urban and rural cultural styles. The metropolitan superculture, as we have seen, was a hybrid; it did not possess the organic links with the folk culture which the traditional high culture had had, and the new elite assumed an ambivalent attitude towards the traditional world which surrounded it.

The postrevolutionary ruling class held the initial advantage that the great part of the Indonesian population was politically inert, that the major cultural tradition was highly deferential, and that the natural source of alternative

leadership for the populace--the "feudal" regional elite--was too sclerosed and discredited to offer an effective challenge. But these factors helped to cover over the gap between the capital-based leadership and the countryside; they did not repair it. The emergence of modern provincial elites presented a more positive means for linkage with the mass of the population, but it also contained the threat of a possible counter-elite challenge. In this, much depended on whether such new sources of leadership could be brought satisfactorily into a social chain headed by the metropolitan elite, which would provide sufficient communication and mobility to keep the members of the secondary leaderships functioning as mediators rather than as saboteurs of metropolitan elite rule. The mass political parties of the 1950's attempted to create such a linkage, but, except for the PKI, they decayed rapidly as effective hierarchies after the elections of the mid-1950's. Thereafter, there was very little organized communication from below: members of secondary elites were bought off with the posts and perquisites of Guided Democracy, were suppressed for having sympathized with the 1958 rebellion, or were left to find their own way in a period of general bureaucratic decay. The moods of the population were apprehended and addressed by Sukarno, but through a direct, emotional contact that bypassed all other levels of leadership.

The Indonesian masses thus remained something of an uncertain quantity to the leaders who represented them in the capital: there was generally little possibility for national politicians to test the degree to which their prestige as aliran spokesmen outweighed their clients' impatience with their social distance and their inter-aliran compromising. In the long run, the tendency of the postrevolutionary political leaders was to place decreasing emphasis on cultivating their mass following and more on maneuver in the insular world of Djakarta politics. There, after all, the decisions were made that could make or break careers, and as long as a politician was recognized as an aliran leader by his colleagues in the national political elite, and especially by Sukarno, it was nearly impossible for his position to be challenged effectively by the aliran clientele below. As a result, aliran representation in the Djakarta elite gradually became something of a humbug; and since the members of that elite were quite aware of this, their uncertainty of the loyalty of their presumed followings outside the capital became greater than ever, and their adherence to the tight little world of Djakarta politics and to the central figure of Sukarno became all the stronger. In the Guided Democracy period, the claims of these leaders for popular approval came to rest almost completely on their identification with Sukarno, and their roles as direct representatives and



pacifiers of the aliran atrophied in favor of their roles as members of his entourage.

At the same time, the claims of the elite to authority were undermined from two different directions. The very powerful traditional sense of hierarchy and deference was slowly being eroded by revolutionary rhetoric and the decay of custom, while the modern claim of the elite to power--its mastery of the expertise needed to run the country--was brought into question by Indonesia's economic and administrative deterioration. Moreover, the reality and relevance of representational elite power were challenged both by Sukarno's personal ascendancy and by the increasing importance of two political forces--the army and the Communist party--whose leaders were only partially accepted into the politics of the capital and whose ideological inclinations were hostile to government based on elite-arranged communal compromise. In the end, Djakarta politics and the metropolitan elite world on which it was based became encapsulated, with only tenuous and ambivalent links to Indonesian society outside; and though efforts have been made after Sukarno's fall to restore the representative and meliorative role of the elite, they have so far done little more than illustrate its isolation.

Although Guided Democracy was in one sense an attempt to preserve the national elite, in another sense it undermined its support. Under that system, as we have seen, Sukarno's rhetoric became the link between the political center and the mass of the population, and that rhetoric maintained the need for a continuing revolution, attacked the corruption of the Western-educated and the Western-thinking, and affirmed the ultimate power of the People as the arbiter of legitimacy. As time went on, the members of the postrevolutionary ruling class became increasingly uncomfortable with the ultimate consequences of this appeal, especially with an ageing President and an advancing PKI. Furthermore, the Sukarnoist rhetoric was one-sided in terms of its aliran appeal: From the beginning, Islam found itself rather in the position of an unwanted stepchild. In the latter years of Guided Democracy, the public favor granted by Sukarno to the PKI-abangan end of the Javanese spectrum was sufficiently great that members of the Nationalist-prijaji stream (and thus of the dominant element in the metropolitan elite) began to ask themselves whether their aliran sympathies for the abangan over against the santri should be allowed to outweigh the growing threat of lower-class unrest posed by the advance of the Rakjat under

Communist aegis.<sup>21</sup>

Adding to these problems of elite-mass linkage was the fact that--again in contrast to the experience of the Netherlands under *verzuiling*--the socio-economic situation in post-revolutionary Indonesia was quite unstable, so that it was very hard for any lasting accommodation to be reached between *aliran* spokesmen. Because available resources declined steadily, political negotiations within the national elite tended to be reduced to haggling over the division of shrinking spoils, which did little to aid its effectiveness or prestige as a ruling group. Within the mass, deprived of any real sense of representation or means to vent frustration, the long-term deterioration caused tensions to build up along economic and communal lines to the point where it became problematic how long they could be controlled. The Communist Party, which was better equipped than the others for a dynamic social role by reason of its ideology, organization, and the incomplete acceptance of its leadership into the "in" group of the Djakarta elite, was able to use these circumstances to appeal on a class basis across *aliran* lines, drawing first of all those from the Nationalist category, culturally the closest to its *abangan* base, but also and increasingly from groups to which it had no ties except on a basis of class struggle.

Needless to say, this extension was perceived by the representatives of the other *aliran* as a threat to their interests; it was, in their eyes, a violation of the ethics of communal politics and reflected ambition-bred indifference to the need for maintaining the delicate *aliran* balance. The isolation of the Djakarta elite from the masses of all *aliran* made this roiling of the lower depths seem doubly dangerous.

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21. The events proceeding from the land-reform campaign of 1964 provide a good illustration of this ambivalence on the PNI-prijaji part, for on the one hand members of that group were most anxious to deal the Communists a blow for fomenting class unrest and on the other hand they were disturbed by the emergence in East Java of *santri* bands, under the quiet sponsorship of army and religious leaders, which engaged in attacks on PKI--i.e., *abangan*--villages. In traveling about Central and East Java at the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965, when the Muslim backlash was under way, I repeatedly found Nationalists shifting in conversation from violent class attack on the PKI to insistence that they must ally with it against militant Islam, depending on whether the land reform action or the Muslim reaction was mentioned at the moment.

It was nearly impossible to accept the Communists' argument that a victory for the left would mean not social upheaval but a more stable and prosperous life for all, and members of the Indonesian "Establishment" therefore generally looked dimly on Sukarno's increasing efforts to grant the Communist leadership a place in the sun.

There was thus reason enough for the metropolitan elite to feel uneasy--indeed, alarmed--for its position by 1965, and even those who did not have the Westernizing orientation that was the open target of the Guided Democracy campaigns could ponder whether they might not better detach themselves from Sukarno and his system. When the October 1965 coup came, it was therefore not difficult for the great part of the national elite to back the army's bid for power. Indeed, the months following the affair saw the elite assume a position that reversed its normal meliorative role, for, tacitly or actively, its members lent encouragement to the aliran massacres which formed a major element in the anti-PKI campaign. In the heat of the time, this rousing of communal emotions probably appeared a price worth paying for the sake of dealing the gravest possible blow to the political movement that, having acquired an aliran base, had gone on to organize the forces at the bottom of society against the ruling class.

Social, economic, and political concessions were of course demanded by the military as the price of its support for the metropolitan elite, to which its leaders only partially belonged;<sup>22</sup> but many of these had already been granted

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22. A few postrevolutionary army leaders--mostly top staff officers--came from families with high social positions. By and large, however, officers generally came from a somewhat lower social and educational background than their equivalents in the civil service. This difference, which was the cause of some feelings of antagonism between the two groups, began to be mended by the end of the 1950's, when it became apparent that the military was going to play a major role in Indonesian affairs and when therefore elite families at all levels began, in traditional fashion, to secure their position by entering into business and marriage arrangements with military officers. The rapid spread of the army's role in the country's economy and administration also provided the wealth and power for officers to become increasingly absorbed into the social elite. But they remained, at least throughout the Guided Democracy period, parvenus in civilian elite eyes, and traditional priajati feelings against men of violence were reinforced by the

in the process of securing the army's cooperation under Guided Democracy. Furthermore, army rule (at least under the conservative style represented by Suharto) required the civilian elite to function as a source of legitimation, expertise, and responsibility, so that there was little question of its being pushed entirely aside. In return the army could protect the national elite from the possible consequences of its inadequate rooting in the larger society by the physical suppression of any real challenge. The country was accordingly depoliticized and entrusted to the hands of elite managers in the hopes that under their guidance economic and social development would be favorable enough to make possible, in the long run, a stable consensual government. This, however far it was from the more populist ideals of the revolution, met one main ambition of the national elite--to achieve the position once held by the colonial Dutch, free to administer without undue concern for the ambitions of lesser leaders and for the susceptibilities of the unfamiliar mass.

#### Secularization and Interest Orientation

One question that has been asked in connection with the post-coup political changes and the long-term impact of cultural modernization and economic pressure is whether communally-based political allegiance is not giving way to interest orientation and specifically to class struggle.<sup>23</sup>

This raises a fundamental question about the relationship between the aliran and the political movements: If the cultural sources of aliran identification existed prior to the parties and represent fundamental points of identification, is it possible for a political movement to attract substantial popular allegiance without at the same time appealing along aliran lines? If it is possible, does this mean that the communal identification has become less important in the society as a whole or that other factors have become so urgent as to temporarily overshadow the continuing aliran alignments? How fixed are the existing aliran? Is an

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consciousness that the power and positions they normally monopolized were passing, perhaps necessarily, but nonetheless regrettably, to outsiders.

23. See W. F. Wertheim, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java"; and also his "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIX, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring-Summer 1966), pp. 115-127.

expansion or contraction of their number possible, or a major shift in the manner in which cultural and ideological cleavages are linked?

These questions can only be answered by history, but there are a few things we may keep in mind in considering the various possibilities. In the first place, it seems unlikely that new aliran of any importance will arise, simply because these allegiances are based on primary identifications, which are now challenged by a purer interest orientation rather than by new modes of primordial loyalty. The major new political force is the army, but unlike its Communist rival it has been incapable of making itself into a mass spokesman for either aliran or other kinds of civilian groups. During the late 1950's, at the time of its first major penetration into civilian politics, and again at the time of Sukarno's overthrow a substantial number of civilians, seeing protection, salvation, or opportunity in army-promoted mass organizations, shifted allegiance to them. There thus seemed at least briefly to be a basis for the establishment of a permanent army-oriented complex of civilian organizations.<sup>24</sup> In fact, however, this did not evolve; such civilian support as the army has been able to muster has been temporary and opportunistic. The reason for this would seem to be that no civilian aliran or substantial interest group finds a natural expression in the military.

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24. In one study, Clifford Geertz suggested that the army was emerging as "yet one more aliran." "The Javanese Village," in G. William Skinner (ed.), Local, Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1959), p. 40. This seems to be in part the product of the somewhat unclear definition of aliran used by Geertz at that point: He declared it to consist of "a political party surrounded by a set of voluntary social organizations formally or informally linked to it," but also--more sweepingly and I think more accurately--stated it to be "more than a mere political party, certainly more than a mere ideology; it is a comprehensive pattern of social integration" (p. 37). At the time Geertz wrote, the army was emerging as a distinct force in Indonesian civilian politics and was promoting a range of mass organizations and fronts; its leaders were buoyed by the conviction that they could clean up the mess made by the party system, and they had not yet been demoralized by the realization that their forces did not possess expertise of the kind needed to solve government problems and that their strength could be sapped by corruption as easily as could the civilians'.



Because of its profession, the army tends to be something of a closed corporation. It has its own style and set of interests, which are not open to civilian participation, and both military *esprit de corps* and the knowledge that guns mean power make for a condescending attitude toward those in civilian life. The army's desire to play a broad political role has been countered by its concern to insulate its members from civilian influence, while its emphasis on hierarchy makes it peculiarly insensitive to voices from below. It has little ideological appeal for members of the existing aliran. Its role as supporter of the status quo recommends it to the elite, but priajati values are strongly opposed to military ones, and moreover army men appear as competitors of the priajati for bureaucratic office. Though many Javanese officers are strongly oriented toward the Abangan cultural world, the army's persecution of the Communists, which involved a santri attack on the abangan population, compromised the army as such with the abangan mass; moreover, in its present role as enforcer of the status quo the military cannot also appear believably as the spokesman for peasant grievances. The army made use of santri discontent immediately before and during Sukarno's overthrow, but its officers are overwhelmingly secular or abangan; they have had long experience fighting Muslim rebellions and distrust militant Islam; and the army, as the most modern and technologically oriented institution in Indonesia, appears as a strongly secularizing element.

Such ideological appeal as the army has had has been to quite small groups who have looked to it as providing a managerial elite (a position taken by some of the Westernized PSI socialists) or a millenary force preparing the way for the rule of a tough-minded technocratic younger generation (as in the student support for the New Order militarists of the initial post-coup period). The army's position has become intertwined with that of secular conservatism, and its main function has become the support of the social order; its power is dominant, but it has not been able to become the ideological heart of any segment of Indonesian society. In spite of assiduous efforts at developing and inculcating a distinctive army ideology, it has not even been able to perform the aliran function of representing a cultural world to its own members.

What seems more likely than the formation of new aliran --and what indeed is already taking place--is a shift of emphasis within the existing streams, leading to a blurring of the earlier distinctions between cultural variants. Thus we find that identification with Islam as an aliran is affected not only by the drain of secularization but also by a shift from traditionalist to modernist interpretations of

the religion.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, one reason for the substantial loss of Nationalist strength to the Communists was a declining tendency on the part of peasant Javanese to follow the prijaji (and thus the Nationalist) lead in favor of identification with a movement which more directly represented their abangan peers. Such shifts as these are linked to an overall process of detraditionalization and social change, but they do not in themselves represent a decline in communal identification: it is altogether possible, for example, for the new-made Islamic modernist to be more fervent in his religious identification than he was as a somewhat disoriented Muslim traditionalist.

At the same time, a general trend toward secularization and interest identification effects the political-cultural relationship within each aliran in the direction of making the aliran more "horizontal"--giving it more the aspect of a class rather than communal representative. Of course, this process need not take place with equal speed and results within the individual aliran. Moreover, the Dutch example shows that it is possible for communalism to remain a viable basis for politics well into a society's modern history. Perhaps the key to the ability for communal politics to endure in Indonesia lies not so much in detraditionalization *per se* as in the way in which economic pressures and anomie combine with trends toward cultural secularization.

It is evident, for example, that increased consciousness of interest has not so far been accompanied by a decline in tension between Santri and Abangan. Anomie has led to a grasping for tradition, particularly in the post-Sukarno era of ideological drift. Moreover, the identification of Islam with commercial and landed wealth gives an economic connotation to anti-santri feeling, so that growing secularization does not necessarily make the santri-abangan dichotomy seem irrelevant. Finally, aliran differences are still politically useful, and so have found their spokesmen. Would-be leaders from the lower ranks, perceiving their chances for automatic acceptance into the ruling elite to be small, have found roles as militant representatives of santri aliran demands. Prijaji politicians, for their part, have sought to renew their loosening hold on the abangan peasantry by stressing the common danger from aggressive Islam. As a result, the Santri-Abangan dichotomy has been strongly

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25. For discussions of this development, see Lance Castles, "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor," Indonesia, I (April 1966), pp. 30-45; and also James Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), especially pp. 81-133.

expressed in post-Sukarno Indonesia in spite of official attempts to pacify it; antagonism between the prijaji and abangan groups, on the other hand, has been driven underground as expressing impermissible class conflict. Whether the lack of open articulation of prijaji-abangan differences means that consciousness of them has ceased to spread or has been channeled effectively into Santri-Abangan hostility is another question: we have seen how in the Guided Democracy period the subterranean flow of political consciousness was in quite another direction from the official ideological course.

As for the permanence of the political-cultural combination reflected in the major aliran, we should note first of all that these have been remarkably persistent in postrevolutionary Indonesia. Nothing has really replaced the Masjumi as the political representative of the modernist santri since that party's dissolution in 1960, and nothing so far appears likely to substitute for the Communist Party as the representative of the abangan folk of Java, though members of both these banned groups have sought shelter in other organizations for protective or careerist reasons. In part, this reflects the encapsulation of national politics: if mass loyalties were not given to a group in the 1950's, that group is not conceived as a major force now, and it is unlikely that this will change unless elections or some other form of renewing the links between elite and mass are brought about.

In part, too, Indonesia's postcolonial experience has tended to reinforce the original identification of political and cultural cleavages in such a way as to make the separation of party and aliran difficult. If a person was considered to belong to a particular aliran for any one of a number of reasons, he was more or less automatically held to be a follower of the political movement which generally represented it, and he shared willy-nilly in that party's gains and losses. The party thus came to be the representative of the cultural community in a very immediate sense; an attack on it meant an attack--spiritually and often physically--on a way of life; and this has meant that allegiance to the political group, though it might rest on no formal membership or programmatic loyalty, has had a stubborn if underground persistence.

On the other hand, we should also bear in mind that communal allegiances have not been the sole source of the major parties' strength and that it has been possible to appeal across these boundaries on grounds of interest--as witness the Communists' rapid extension of their support beyond an abangan foundation following the general election of 1955. Moreover, though the identification of a particular



community with a political party has tended to be stable in the postcolonial period, the present pattern did not always exist, and there is no reason to be sure it is now immutable. Although historical accident played an important part in the process by which aliran loyalties were formed, the identification of culture groups with modern political ideologies was by no means entirely arbitrary, and it is therefore at least theoretically possible that the assumption of a radically different role by a major party might result in a shift in its aliran sources of support.<sup>26</sup> Militating against such change, however, are the long period of public identification of specific political ideologies with certain aliran and the communal violence following the October 1965 coup, which probably did a good deal to rigidify political-cultural identification at the mass level.

Aliran identification, while it provides a base of support relatively impervious to persecution by the authorities, creates an enormous problem for any political movement trying to mobilize for social revolutionary purposes, for it is extremely likely that efforts at open class struggle will dissolve into communal conflict. Certainly the upholders of the status quo, should they feel their power failing, would have every reason to salvage their position by encouraging communal feelings against the aliran most identified with

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26. For example, the two centers of Communist rebellion in 1926-1927 were the strongly Islamic areas of West Java and West Sumatra, which in the 1951-1965 period were centers of opposition to Communism. Furthermore, a fair amount of the Communist cadres in those areas came from petty trader or rich peasant background, and a number were religious activists. The principal reason for the support for the PKI in those areas appears to have been that that party represented the strongest opposition to colonial rule--i.e., to control and taxation from Batavia (Djakarta). In the postrevolutionary period, these areas continued to be foci of resistance to control by the capital; but in the same period, the Communists appeared as strong supporters of Djakarta. Since 1965, the PKI's position has been reversed; it is now the symbol of opposition to the government's authority. Does this mean that it will also garner significant anti-centralist support, which would greatly increase its strength outside Java? There are other factors involved, and many communal allegiances have now been sealed in blood; but it is worth bearing in mind as a caution against taking the aliran-party identifications as eternal and inseparable.

revolutionary challenge. On the other hand, the metropolitan elite is both isolated politically from the rest of Indonesian society and represents a broadly unsatisfactory status quo, and this presents revolutionaries with the possibility of recruiting younger-generation activists from the economically less favored segments of the major aliran for the pursuit of popular salvation through the destruction of the ruling class.

This sort of "liberation front" appeal, utilizing some more socially radical version of the *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism* arguments for unity in the revolutionary cause and relying on the sense of social dislocation and economic urgency to transform communal distrust into mutual hatred for the rulers, would seem a more likely means of overcoming the revolutionaries' disadvantage than would an approach that relied on the probably distant day when aliran identification no longer really matters. Whether such a movement, assuming it could be successfully launched, would be able to maintain both unity and discipline would presumably depend on whether its leadership lay in fact with an effective and noncommunal core or whether it was, as in the independence movement, a coalition of relatively independent and ideologically diverse actors.

In terms of revolutionary strategy, the arguments of *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism* may thus still have meaning; but the essay's assumptions as to the basis for Indonesian political stability are probably less durable. Perhaps they never really were relevant, given the social and economic pressures to which Indonesia was subjected from the outset of its independence. In any case, the elite cohesiveness, authority, and exclusive control of politics essential to the maintenance of a successful *verzuiling* were severely eroded in the postrevolutionary period, until, as we have seen, the elite grew to be a political appendage first of Sukarno and then of the army. To revive the role of the ruling class as an effective representative and negotiator of aliran differences would almost certainly require an extensive injection of new blood from below--thus reducing the level of elite cohesiveness--and would bring with it all the destabilizing factors inherent in popular politics in a time of transition and hardship. The potential for destabilization has already been illustrated in the difficulty experienced in containing militant Islam since the 1965 coup: although that aliran has been prevented from making more than minor political gains at the center against the *prijaji*-oriented civilian bureaucrats and the secularly-inclined military elite, it has been a source of constant pressure on them and a sometimes violent pursuer of power in the outlying regions. It is unlikely, given this experience, that the elite will

summon up communal passions again, save, *in extremis*, as a desperate maneuver to divide the forces of social revolution.

Aliran political activity also poses an intrinsic threat to the unity of the army, on whose monolithic quality the state's stability now largely depends. Aliran affections form a tie between the military and civilian worlds, for the ranks particularly, but also for many of the more culturally parochial officers; they form a means of subverting loyalties from military to civilian ends, and they also are a basis on which discontented military men can quickly gain a civilian following to back their bids for power. Consequently, the military leadership as well as the metropolitan civilian elite has every reason to attempt to divert politics away from too strong an emphasis on aliran orientation. A conservative regime may strive to maintain a constricted form of aliran representation in order to prevent the total estrangement of the elite from the masses and to preserve an alternative to class-based solidarity. A radical government might seek to replace both communal and interest representation by the monolithic organization of the populace. But when elite consensus no longer exists, or carries insufficient weight to recommend its compromises to the mass of the population, a nondisruptive communal politics cannot be maintained.

Ruth T. McVey

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## NATIONALISM, ISLAM AND MARXISM

Like the son of Bima,<sup>1</sup> who was born in an age of struggle, Young Indonesia<sup>2</sup> now sees the light of day, at a time when the peoples of Asia are deeply dissatisfied with their lot--dissatisfied with their economic lot, dissatisfied with their political lot and dissatisfied with their lot in every other respect!

The age of being satisfied with conditions as they are has passed.

A new age, a youthful age has arrived, like the dawn of a clear morning.

The conservative theory that "the little man must be satisfied with his lot, content to sit in the background of historical events and offer himself and his possessions in the service of those who stand out in front," is no longer accepted by the people of Asia. Their faith that the men who rule them today are true "guardians" who will one day relinquish their "guardianship" is also wearing thin. Less and less do they believe that those who rule them today are really "elder brothers" who will voluntarily let them go free when they are "mature" and have "come of age."

This disbelief is based on the knowledge, is based on the conviction that the primary cause of colonization is not the desire for fame nor the wish to see the world; nor is it the longing for freedom, nor population pressures faced by the colonizers in their own countries, as Gustav Klemm would have it.<sup>3</sup> The prime cause of colonization is the search for gain.

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1. The popular hero of the wajang shadow-play, Raden Gatutkatja.
  2. The magazine in which this article originally appeared was called Suluh Indonesia Muda (The Torch of Young Indonesia).
  3. Gustav Klemm (1802-1867) was a German historian whose ten-volume Culturgeschichte der Menschheit (Cultural History of Mankind) had a considerable reputation in its time.

"Colonization is primarily the result of shortages of goods in the home country," according to Dietrich Schäfer.<sup>4</sup> It was these shortages which caused the Europeans to seek their fortunes abroad, and explains why they colonized those countries which would yield them a profitable livelihood. And this is the reason, of course, why it is very difficult to believe in the emancipation of these colonies by their colonizers. A man does not readily give up his source of livelihood, since in doing so he signs his own death warrant.

So it is that year after year, decade after decade, the peoples of Europe have held dominion over the countries of Asia. For decades, profits from Asia have found their way back to Europe, especially to Western Europe, which has thereby amassed untold wealth.

Such is the tragic history of the colonies! It is the realization of this tragedy which has awakened the colonized peoples. For, even though outwardly defeated and submissive, the Spirit of Asia is eternal. The Spirit of Asia is still alive, like an inextinguishable flame. It is the realization of this tragedy that has now become the inner spirit of the people's movement in Indonesia, a movement with a single common goal, yet with three aspects--Nationalist, Islamic and Marxist.

It is the responsibility of each and every one of us to study these three aspects, to determine the relationship between them, to prove that in a colonial situation hostility between them is pointless, and to show that these three "waves" can work together to form a single, gigantic and irresistible tidal wave.

Whether or not we will succeed in carrying out this heavy and glorious responsibility is not for us to determine. Nevertheless, we must never abandon our efforts, we must never stop trying to fulfill our obligation to help unite these forces into a single movement. I am convinced that it is only this unity which will bring us to the realization of our dreams: a Free Indonesia.

I do not know how this unity will be achieved or what form it will take. But of one thing I am certain: the ship that will take us to a Free Indonesia is the Ship of Unity! Perhaps we have as yet no Mahatma, a helmsman who can build

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4. Dietrich Schäfer (1845-1929) was a German historian noted for his Weltgeschichte der Neuzeit (Modern World History).



and steer this Ship of Unity.<sup>5</sup> Yet I am convinced that eventually the day will come when a Mahatma will appear in our midst. That is why I am proud to do my part in searching for and smoothing the way toward this unity. That indeed is the purpose of this short article.

#### Nationalism, Islam and Marxism

These are the principles embraced by the peoples' movements all over Asia. These are the concepts which have become the spirit of the movements in Asia as well as of the movements here in Indonesia.

The Budi Utomo, the "late" Nationaal Indische Partij--which is still "alive"--the Partai Sarekat Islam, the Perserikatan Minahasa, the Partai Komunis Indonesia, and many other parties each have their own spirit of Nationalism, Islam or Marxism.<sup>6</sup> Can these spirits work together in a

5. Sukarno is clearly alluding to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), and the central role that he played in the Indian nationalist movement of the time. The honorific title of Mahatma (Great Soul) was given to Gandhi by his fellow nationalists because of his extraordinary personal qualities and his unifying leadership.
6. Budi Utomo, founded on May 20, 1908, is usually regarded as the first modern nationalist organization in Indonesian history. Javanese in orientation, it was cautious and cooperative in its attitude towards the colonial authorities. The Nationaal Indische Partij (National Indies Party) was the new name given in July 1919 to the older Indische Partij. The objective of the party was the independence of the Netherlands Indies, on the basis of cooperation between all racial groups residing there. It drew its main strength from the Eurasian community. Sukarno here alludes to the fact that most of its top leaders were exiled or imprisoned by the Dutch colonial government. The Partai Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association Party) was established in February 1923 by anti-Communist leaders of the Sarekat Islam, which was in the process of disintegrating due to the conflict between its Marxist and Islamic wings. The Perserikatan Minahasa (Minahassan Association) was founded on Java in August 1912, to represent the interests of migrant Menadonese from North Sulawesi. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) was formed on May 23, 1920.

colonial system to form one Great Spirit, the Spirit of Unity? A Spirit of Unity that will lead us to the arena of Greatness?

In colonial territories can the Nationalist movement be joined with the Islamic movement, which essentially denies the nation? Can it be allied with Marxism, which proclaims an international struggle?

Under colonial systems can Islam, as a religion, cooperate with Nationalism, which stresses the nation, and with Marxism, which teaches materialism?

Will we be successful in our efforts to bring together the Budi Utomo, which is so patient, gentle and moderate, with the PKI whose thrust is so forceful and whose struggle is so militant and radical? The Budi Utomo, which is so evolutionary by nature, and the PKI, which, though very small, has been hounded and repressed by its enemies, who have apparently taken to heart Al. Carthill's warning that "rebellions are usually the work of minorities, indeed of tiny minorities."<sup>7</sup>

#### Nationalism! Nationhood!

In 1882 Ernest Renan expressed his views on the concept of the nation.<sup>8</sup> A nation, he said, has a soul, an intellectual foundation, which consists of two things: first of all, a people must have shared a common history; secondly, a people must possess the will and desire to live as one. Neither race, language, religion, common needs nor state boundaries make a nation.

In recent years, aside from such writers as Karl Kautsky and Karl Radek, it has been Otto Bauer above all who has studied the concept of the nation.<sup>9</sup>

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7. Al. Carthill was the pseudonym of Bennet Christian Huntington Calcraft Kennedy (d. 1935), a writer and critic of conditions in India under British Imperial rule.
  8. Ernest Renan (1823-1892)--the celebrated French historian and philosopher.
  9. Karl Radek (1885-1939)--the well-known Bolshevik journalist and Comintern luminary. Karl Kautsky (1854-1938)--the prominent revisionist theoretician of the German Social Democratic Party, and editor of the influential

"A nation is a unity of attitudes which derives from a unity of historical experience," he says.

Nationalism is the conviction, the consciousness of a people, that they are united in one group, one nation.

Whatever the explanations advanced by these master theorists, it is certain that nationalist feeling creates a sense of self-confidence, and this is something absolutely essential if we are to defend ourselves in the struggle to overcome conditions that would defeat us.

It was this self-confidence which made the Budi Utomo people steadfast and determined in their efforts to achieve a Greater Java; it is this self-confidence which endows the revolutionary nationalists with the will to seek a Greater Indies or a Free Indonesia.

Can the feeling of nationalism--which, because of this very self-confidence so easily turns into national arrogance and no less easily takes the further step of becoming racial arrogance, even though the concept of race is utterly different from the concept of nation, since race is a biological, while nationalist is a sociological concept--in the struggle of the colonized peoples can Nationalism be coupled with Islam, which in its essence knows no nation and which in fact has been embraced by a variety of nations and races? Under colonial systems, can Nationalism ally itself with Marxism, which is international and inter-racial?

With full conviction, I answer: "Yes!"

Although Nationalism by its very nature excludes all parties who do not share the "desire to live as one"; although Nationalism actually belittles all groups which do not feel that they are "one group, one nation" with the people; although Nationalism in principle rejects all attitudes which do not stem from a "unity of historical experience," we should not forget that the men who built the Islamic and Marxist movements here in Indonesia, as well as those who guide the Nationalist movement, all share the "desire to live as one," and that, along with the Nationalists, these

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Die Neue Zeit (New Times). Otto Bauer (1881-1938)--a leading theoretician of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, whose book, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die österreichische Sozialdemokratie (The Nationalities Question and Austrian Social Democracy), first published in 1906, was very influential in the European socialist movement of the time.

people feel they are members of "one group, one nation." We must also not forget that all elements in our movement, whether they are Nationalist, Islamic or Marxist, have shared for hundreds of years a "unity of historical experience." For hundreds of years they have shared a common experience of bondage. We must also not overlook the fact that it is this "unity of historical experience," this common lot, which creates the feeling of "belonging." It is of course true that group feelings can give rise to quarrels and divisions; it is true that till now there have never been strong feelings of friendship between the different movements in Indonesia. But it is not the purpose of this article to prove that quarrels cannot occur. If we want to quarrel, it is surely not difficult to find a pretext for doing so right away!

The purpose of this article is rather to prove that friendship can be attained.

Let Nationalists who exclude and belittle all movements which are not confined to Nationalism be guided by the words of Karamchand Gandhi: "For me, my love of my country is part of my love for all mankind. I am a patriot because I am a human being, and act as a human being. I do not exclude anyone." This was the secret which enabled Gandhi to unite Moslems with Hindus, Parsis, Jains and Sikhs, all in all a population of more than three hundred millions, six times the population of Indonesia and almost one fifth of the human beings on this earth.

There is nothing to prevent Nationalists from working together with Moslems and Marxists. Look at the abiding relationship between the Nationalist Gandhi and the Pan-Islamicists, Maulana Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali!<sup>10</sup> When the non-cooperation movement in India was at its height, they were virtually inseparable. Look at the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) Party's readiness to accept the Marxist

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10. Maulana Mohamed Ali (1878-1931) and Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-?) were the two brothers who led the ill-fated Khalifat (Caliphate) Pan-Islamic movement in India in the early 1920's. Gandhi supported their movement until it collapsed with Kemal Ataturk's abolition of the Caliphate. They in turn backed his Swaraj movement. On his release from prison in 1923, Maulana Mohamed Ali was elected President of the Indian National Congress with Gandhi's support. By 1928, however, growing antagonism between their respective Islamic and Hindu constituencies created a breach between them which was never to be healed. Sukarno was writing just before this breach became apparent.

ideas of opposition to militarism, opposition to imperialism and opposition to capitalism!<sup>11</sup>

I do not expect Nationalists to change their views and become Moslems or Marxists; nor is it my intention to order Marxists and Moslems to turn around and become Nationalists. Rather my dream is harmony, unity between these three groups.

Actually, provided we have the will, there is no lack of ways to achieve this unity. Determination, confidence in each other's sincerity and consciousness of the truth of the saying "Harmony brings security" (this is the best possible bridge to unity) are strong enough to overcome all the differences and misgivings between the various groups within our movement.

I repeat: There is nothing to prevent Nationalists from working together with Moslems and Marxists.

A true Nationalist whose love for his country is based on a knowledge of the world economic system and of history and does not arise from sheer national arrogance, a Nationalist who is not a chauvinist, necessarily rejects all forms of narrow-minded exclusivism. A true Nationalist whose nationalism is not merely a copy of Western Nationalism, but stems rather from a feeling of love for humanity and his fellow-men, a nationalist who receives his feeling of nationalism as an inspiration<sup>12</sup> and who puts it into practice as a matter of duty and service, is immune to petty and narrow views. For him, this feeling of love for his country is something vast and all-encompassing--like the atmosphere, which has room for everything needed to sustain the life of each living thing.

Alas, why is it that the love Indonesian nationalists bear their country turns to hatred when they encounter Indonesians of Moslem persuasion? Why does their love turn into hostility when they meet Indonesian Marxists? Is there no place in their hearts for the nationalism of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Mahatma Gandhi or Chitta Ranjan Das?<sup>13</sup>

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11. Once again, Sukarno was fortunate in the timing of his article, since the bloody break between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party took place early the following year (April 1927).
  12. Sukarno uses the Javanese term wahju, which carries the connotation of divine inspiration.
  13. Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915) was a well-known

We must at all costs avoid embracing a jingoistic nationalism such as that of Arya-Samaj, which split and divided the Hindus and Moslems in India.<sup>14</sup> This type of jingoistic nationalism will "certainly end in its own destruction," since "nationalism can only achieve its goals if it is based on higher principles."

Indeed, it is only a true Eastern nationalism which should be embraced by true Eastern nationalists. European nationalism--which is an aggressive nationalism, a nationalism that only pursues its own selfish interests, a commercial nationalism obsessed with profit and loss--will surely end in defeat, will certainly end in its own destruction.

Is there any valid objection to true Nationalists cooperating with Moslems on the grounds that Islam's supra-national and supra-territorial character transcends particular nationalities and nations? Does the international nature of Islam constitute a hindrance to the development of nationalism?

Many of our nationalists forget that the nationalist and Islamic movements in Indonesia--indeed in all of Asia--had the same origin, as I explained at the beginning of this article. Both originated in a strong desire to resist the West, or, more precisely, Western capitalism and imperialism. So they are really not enemies, but allies. How much more noble is the nationalism of Prof. T. L. Vaswami, a non-Moslem,<sup>15</sup> who writes: "If Islam is sick, the Spirit of Eastern Freedom will surely suffer too, since the more the Moslem countries lose their freedom, the more European imperialism will stifle the Spirit of Asia. However, I have faith in the Asia of old; I believe that her Spirit will emerge

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Congress politician and moderate nationalist of the older, pre-Gandhi generation. Chitta Ranjan Das (1870-1925) was a more radically inclined nationalist politician and journalist, who worked with Gandhi in the non-cooperation movement of the 1920's.

14. Arya-Samaj (Society of Aryans) was a fundamentalist reform sect of Hinduism established in 1875 by Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883) in Bombay. It stressed the Vedic tradition, opposed the caste system and the segregation of the untouchables, and was strongly opposed to Christianity, Islam and Puranic Hinduism.
15. T. L. Vaswami (1879-?) was a highly respected Hindu philosopher and religious teacher.



victorious. Islam is international: and if Islam is free, then our nationalism will be strengthened by the entire force of this international faith."

And that is not all. Many of our nationalists forget that a Moslem, wherever he may be in the Dar al-Islam,<sup>16</sup> is obliged by his religion to work for the welfare of the people in whose country he resides. These nationalists also forget that a Moslem who truly practices Islam, whether he is an Arab, an Indian, an Egyptian or of any other nationality, is bound, so long as he lives in Indonesia, to work for Indonesia's welfare! "Wherever a Moslem resides, however far from his country of birth, he remains in this new country a part of the Islamic people, a part of the union of Islam. Wherever a Moslem lives, he must love, and he must work for, the needs of that country and its people."

This is Islamic Nationalism! The nationalist who is hostile to Islam of this kind is mean-spirited and narrow-minded. He is mean-spirited and narrow-minded because he is hostile to a principle which, although international and inter-racial, obliges all its adherents in Indonesia, regardless of their national origin, to love and to work for the needs of Indonesia and her people.

Is there any valid objection to true Nationalists working together with Marxists on the grounds that Marxism is international?

A Nationalist who is reluctant to stand alongside of and to cooperate with Marxists reveals his acute lack of knowledge of the dynamics of world politics and history. He forgets that the origin of the Marxist movement in Indonesia or in Asia is the same as the origin of his own movement. He forgets that the direction of his own movement often coincides with the course of the Marxist movement. He forgets that hostility towards his Marxist compatriots is equivalent to rejecting a traveling-companion and to increasing the number of his enemies. He forgets and fails to understand the meaning of the attitude of his brothers in other parts of Asia. For example, the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a very great Nationalist leader, was delighted to cooperate with the Marxists, although he was convinced that a Marxist order could not at that time be instituted in China, because conditions there were not yet ripe. Do I need to give further proof that Nationalism--whether as a principle which arises from

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16. Dar al-Islam, strictly speaking, means Abode of Islam, or House of Islam. More generally, it is used to refer to the international Moslem community.

"the desire to live as one," or as the consciousness of a people that they belong to a single group, a single nationality, or as a unity of attitudes resulting from a common historical experience--do I need to give further proof that Nationalism can ally itself with Islam and Marxism, provided that its adherents are willing to do so? Do I need to cite further examples of the attitudes of champions of Nationalism in other countries, who walk hand in hand with Moslems and have close relationships with Marxists?

I think not! I believe that this article, although brief and far from perfect, is already clear enough for those of our Nationalists who really want unity. I believe that all young Nationalists stand beside me. I believe, too, that there are many old-fashioned Nationalists who also want unity; only their lack of faith in the durability of such unity discourages them from struggling to achieve it. It is particularly to them that this article is addressed; it is above all for them that it is intended.

I am not writing for Nationalists who do not want unity. I leave this type of Nationalist to the judgment of history.

### Islam

Like the break of day after the darkness of night, like the close of the Dark Ages, two great figures lit up the Moslem world in the nineteenth century. These two figures, whose names will forever be inscribed in the history of Islam, were Sheikh Mohammed 'Abduh, Rector of Al-Azhar University,<sup>17</sup> and al-Sayyid Jaman al-Din al-Afghani,<sup>18</sup> two

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17. Sheikh Mohammed 'Abduh (1849-1905), Rector of Al-Azhar University in Cairo and Grand Mufti of Egypt, was the spiritual father of the movement to re-interpret Islam in the light of modern conditions. In his fatwa he consistently stressed the need to abandon blind obedience (taqlid) to mediaeval incrustations on Islamic doctrine and to apply individual rationality to the problems facing Islam in the modern world.
  18. Al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), philosopher, journalist and politician, was probably the most remarkable Moslem figure of the nineteenth century. His youth was spent in Afghanistan, but his involvement in the Afghan civil wars forced him to flee to Constantinople in 1870. After lecturing at the university there for a while, he was accused of being a free-thinker and

champions of the Pan-Islamic movement, who awakened and regenerated the Moslem peoples all over Asia from their state of darkness and decline. Although the views of these two heroes differed slightly--al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was more radical than Sheikh Mohammed 'Abduh--it was they who revived the political aspects of Islam, especially al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who first inspired feelings of resistance to the danger of Western imperialism in the hearts of the Moslem peoples. It was these two men, again particularly al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who first preached a solid Moslem front against the peril of Western imperialism.

Right up to his death in 1896, al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the brave lion of Pan-Islam, worked unceasingly to sow the seeds of Islam everywhere, to sow the seeds of resistance to Western greed, and to implace the conviction that for successful resistance, Moslems would have to "acquire the technique of Western progress and learn the secrets of European power."<sup>19</sup> Those seeds have been sown! Like a wave growing larger and stronger, like a wave surging higher and higher, the armies of Pan-Islam have together risen up throughout the Islamic world, and are on the move from Turkey and Egypt to Morocco, the Congo, Persia and Afghanistan . . .

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was deported to Cairo. There he led the movement of nationalist revival until his strongly anti-European views led the British to exile him to India. In 1883 he appeared in Paris, where together with the exiled 'Abduh he published the famous journal al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa (The Unbreakable Bond), in which he attacked British policy towards the Moslem countries. In 1886 he was invited to Persia, where he rapidly built up a large following. His attacks on the Persian government for granting concessions to a British tobacco trust made him many enemies. In 1892 he accepted the invitation of the Ottoman Sultan to return to Constantinople, where he died in 1897, a year after one of his disciples had assassinated the Shah of Persia. He was a strong proponent of liberalism and Pan-Islam, urging the unity of all Moslem countries under one Caliph.

19. The translation of this quotation is drawn directly from the original phrase in Lothrop Stoddard, The New World of Islam (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), p. 65. Though Sukarno does not mention Stoddard's name, large parts of this section on Islam are based on his book. The incorrect date given by Sukarno for al-Afghani's death, for example, simply reproduces Stoddard's original error (p. 64).

flooding into India and on to Indonesia . . . the wave of Pan-Islam is surging forward everywhere!

So it is that some of our Indonesian people, conscious of their tragic lot, have taken shelter under the green flag, turning their faces towards Mecca and reciting: *La haula wala kawwata illa billah* and *Billahi fisabilil ilahi*.<sup>20</sup>

At first this movement proceeded slowly, and the path it was to take was not clear; but with time the direction became clearer and more definite, and connections with Islamic movements in other countries increased. More and more the movement took on an international character; increasingly it based itself on religious law. Hence we should not be surprised that an American professor, Ralston Hayden, wrote that the Sarekat Islam movement "will greatly influence future political events, not only in Indonesia, but throughout the Eastern world!"<sup>21</sup> By this statement, Ralston Hayden indicated his conviction as to the international character of Sarekat Islam; he also showed clear insight into events which had not yet occurred when he wrote. Has not the prospect that he pointed to already come to pass? The Islamic movement in Indonesia has already become a branch of the Mu'tamar-i 'Alam-i Islami (World Islamic Congress) in Mecca;<sup>22</sup> the Indonesian Islamic movement has already plunged into the sea of the Asian Islamic struggle.

It has been the increasing emphasis on religion within the Islamic movement that has caused Marxists to be reluctant to align themselves with it. At the same time, the growing prominence of the international aspect of the Islamic movement is regarded by old-fashioned Nationalists as a deviation. Almost all Nationalists, whether "old-fashioned" or "modern," evolutionary or revolutionary, share the conviction that religion should not be involved in politics. On the other hand, "fanatical" Moslems scorn the nationalist politique of the Nationalists and despise the economic politique of the Marxists. They regard a nationalist politique as

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20. These phrases mean: "There is no one greater than Allah"; and "For no other, only for the sake of Allah."
  21. The reference is to Joseph Ralston Hayden, Vice Governor-General of the Philippines from 1933-1935, and author of the classic The Philippines (New York: Macmillan, 1942).
  22. This decision was taken at the Extraordinary Islamic Conference sponsored by the Sarekat Islam, which took place in Surabaya in December 1924.

narrow and an economic politique as crudely materialist. In short, one finds an almost "perfect" conflict of viewpoints.

Nationalists and Marxists both blame Islam for the downfall of the Moslem nations, their present backwardness and the fact that most of them are under Western domination.

But they are confused! It is not Islam, but rather its adherents who have been at fault. Seen from a nationalist and socialist perspective, it would be hard to find a civilization comparable in greatness to that of the early Islamic world. The downfall of national greatness, the downfall of Islamic socialism was not brought about by Islam itself, but by the moral downfall of its leaders. Once Amir Mu'awiya insisted on a worldly, dynastic basis for the Caliphate, once the "Caliphs became Kings," the true nature of Islam was suppressed.<sup>23</sup> As Umar Said Tjokroaminoto once said, "It is Amir Mu'awiya who must bear the responsibility for the corruption of the true nature of Islam, which was clearly socialist in character."<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, from the national point of view, is it not true that Islam offers examples of greatness which continue to astound the student of world history and culture?

The downfall of Islam was the result of the moral downfall of its leaders. The West seized the Moslem nations

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23. Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan (602?-680) was Governor of Syria under the Caliph Othman. After Othman's murder, he refused to recognize the full authority of the Caliph Ali and, with the backing of well-trained Syrian troops, became Caliph himself in 660. Realizing that after years of internecine quarrels among the Prophet's surviving comrades, the political unity of the Moslem community could only be assured by military means and hereditary rule, he exacted a general oath of allegiance to his son Yazid during his own lifetime to ensure a smooth succession after his death. Although the hereditary principle was an offense to many Moslems of the time, Mu'awiya was able to establish securely the foundations of what became the Omayyad dynasty.
  24. Raden Mas Hadji Umar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934) was the dominant figure in the Sarekat Islam from 1912 onwards, and was perhaps the first nationalist leader to develop a mass popular backing. Sukarno boarded at Tjokroaminoto's house from 1915 to 1921 while at secondary school in Surabaya, and the older man became both his political mentor, and, for a short while, his father-in-law.

because of the Moslems' own weakened faith in God, and also because the laws of evolution and the social system made Western depredation a *historische Notwendigkeit*, a historical necessity. On the other hand, it was their deep faith in God that gave the Riffs the fortitude to resist the cannons of Spanish and French imperialism!<sup>25</sup>

True Islam contains no anti-nationalist principles; true Islam is not anti-socialist in character. So long as Moslems remain hostile to the ideas of broad-minded Nationalism and genuine Marxism, they will never stand on the Sirothol Mustaqim<sup>26</sup> and they will never be able to lift Islam from its present state of humiliation and decay. I am certainly not saying that Islam accepts Materialism; nor do I forget that Islam transcends national boundaries and is supra-national in character. I am only stating that true Islam is socialist in nature and imposes obligations which are nationalist obligations as well.

Is it not the case, as I have already explained, that true Islam requires all its adherents to love and to work for the country in which they reside, to love and to work for the people among whom they live, so long as that country and its people are part of the Dar al-Islam? Everywhere he went al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani preached nationalism and patriotism--which were denounced as "fanaticism" by his enemies. Everywhere he went this champion of Pan-Islam preached self-respect, preached a sense of pride, preached national honor--which were all instantly labeled "chauvinism." Everywhere, especially in Egypt, al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din sowed the seeds of nationalism. It was he who became "the father of every shade of Egyptian nationalism."<sup>27</sup>

Al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din was not the only one to sow the seeds of nationalism and love of country. Arabi Pasha,<sup>28</sup>

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25. Sukarno here refers to the great uprising of the Berbers in the Rif Mountains under the leadership of Mohammed Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi (1881-1963), otherwise known as Abd-el-Krim. This uprising in Northeastern Morocco lasted from 1919 to 1926 and required the cooperation of large French and Spanish armies for its final suppression.
  26. This is the bridge to Heaven in Islamic belief. This passage is drawn from Stoddard, New World of Islam, p. 64.
  27. The translation is taken from the original in Stoddard, New World of Islam, p. 176.
  28. Arabi Pasha--more exactly Ahmad Urabi Pasha (1839-1911)--



Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid Bey,<sup>29</sup> Ali Pasha, Ahmed Bey Agayeff,<sup>30</sup> Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali were all great Moslem leaders who taught love of country; all were propagandists of nationalism in their respective countries! May these leaders serve as examples for those Moslems amongst us who are "fanatical," and narrow-minded, and who refuse to recognize their obligation to align themselves with the nationalist movement. Let these Moslems remember that their anti-infidel movement will certainly give rise to a feeling of nationalism, since the groups they call infidel are mostly people from foreign countries, not people from Indonesia! An Islam which opposes a genuine national movement is no true Islam; this type of Islam is an "old-fashioned" Islam which does not understand the trend of the times.

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was the first notable leader of modern Egyptian nationalism. Strongly anti-Turkish and anti-European in orientation, he led a quasi-coup against the Khedive Tewfik in 1881, and as a result was appointed Minister of War in 1882. Later that year he was overthrown by the British at the battle of Tall-al-Kabir, and exiled to Ceylon.

29. Mustafa Kamil Pasha (1874-1908) was a European-trained lawyer who founded the first Egyptian nationalist party (the National Party) in 1907. Starting out as a Pan-Islamicist, he later veered towards Egyptian nationalism, to which he gave a generally anti-British and pro-French cast. Muhammad Farid (1868-1919) was Mustafa Kamil's successor as leader of the National Party, and generally took a more radical stance than his predecessor both on relations with the British and on social questions. The title 'Bey,' conferred on him by Sukarno, appears first in Stoddard, New World of Islam, p. 180.
30. Ali Pasha (1815-1871) was a prominent Turkish reformist statesman of the middle nineteenth century. He was largely responsible for the liberal rescript of 1856, guaranteeing equal rights for all persons within the Ottoman Empire. (Cf. Stoddard, New World of Islam, p. 65.) The otherwise obscure Ahmed Bey Agayeff is described by Stoddard as a Volga Tatar, whose organ Turk Yurdu (Turkish Home) was an important source of Pan-Turanian propaganda in the last years before the First World War. The Pan-Turanian movement envisioned a Turanian (Turko-Tatar) world stretching from Finland to Manchuria, but its main targets were the Ottomans of Turkey, the Tatars of Russia and the Turkomans of Persia and Central Asia. (Cf. Stoddard, New World of Islam, pp. 196-197.)

Thus I am convinced that we can bring Moslems and Marxists together, although basically the two groups differ widely in their principles.

My heart is sad when I remember the dark and gloomy atmosphere in Indonesia some years ago, when I was witness to a fratricidal struggle, when I was witness to the outbreak of bitter hostilities between Marxists and Moslems, when I was witness to the division of our movement's forces into two warring factions. It is this struggle which fills the darkest pages of our history. It was this fratricidal struggle that dissipated all the force of our movement, which should otherwise have grown stronger and stronger. It was this struggle which set back our movement several decades.<sup>31</sup>

Alas! How strong our movement would now be if this fratricidal struggle had not occurred! Our ranks would surely not be in their present disarray. Our movement would surely have made progress in spite of all obstructions.

I am convinced that there is no fundamental barrier to friendship between Moslems and Marxists. I have already explained that true Islam has a socialist quality. Even though this socialist quality is not necessarily Marxist in orientation, even though we know that Islamic socialism does not have the same foundation as Marxism, since Islamic socialism is based on Spirituality, whereas Marxist socialism is based on Materialism--nonetheless, for our purposes it is enough to show that true Islam is essentially socialistic.

Moslems must not forget that the Marxist materialist view of history has often served to guide them in confronting the difficult and complicated economic and political problems of the world. They must also not forget that the Historical-Materialist method for explaining events which have already occurred here on this earth is also a method for predicting events that are to come--and thus may be very useful to their group.

Moslems must never forget that capitalism, the enemy of Marxism, is also the enemy of Islam, since what is called surplus value in Marxist doctrine is essentially the same as usury from the Islamic viewpoint. Theoretically, surplus value is the appropriation of the product of another's labor and denying the workers their proper share of the value they produce. This theory of surplus value was formulated by Karl

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31. Sukarno refers to the deep hostility between the Communists and Moslems in the Sarekat Islam, which eventually broke up that organization from within.

Marx and Friedrich Engels to explain the origins of capitalism. Surplus value is the inner essence of every capitalist system; by combatting surplus value, Marxists combat the very roots of capitalism.

The true Moslem accordingly comprehends immediately that it is wrong for him to be hostile towards Marxism, which combats the system of surplus value, since he does not forget that true Islam combats this system too, that true Islam strictly prohibits usury and the collection of interest. He understands that usury is basically no different from what the Marxists view as surplus value.

"Devour not usury, doubled and redoubled, and fear you God; haply so you will prosper." So it is written in the Koran, *surah* Al 'Imran, verse 129.<sup>32</sup>

A broad-minded Moslem, a Moslem who understands the requirements of our struggle, will certainly agree to an alliance with the Marxists, since he is aware that usury and the collection of interest are forbidden by his religion. He is aware that this is the Moslem way of attacking the very foundations of capitalism, for, as we have previously explained, usury is the same as surplus value, the inner essence of capitalism. He is aware that, like Marxism, Islam, with its "belief in God," with its "recognition of the Kingdom of God," is a protest against the evils of capitalism.

The "fanatical" Moslem, who is hostile to the Marxist movement, is a Moslem who does not know what his own religion forbids. Such a Moslem does not understand that true Islam, like Marxism, forbids the capitalistic hoarding of money, forbids the accumulation of wealth for selfish ends. He forgets the verse in the Koran: "Those who treasure up gold and silver, and do not expend them in the way of God,--give them the good tidings of a painful chastisement!"<sup>33</sup> He [does not] understand that, like the Marxism he opposes, Islam hereby attacks the existence of capitalism in the clearest possible terms!

There are many other obligations and tenets of Islam which are identical with the aims and purposes of Marxism.

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32. In Arberry's version, this is verse 125. His translations have been used throughout. See A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 89-90.
33. Koran, surah on 'Repentance,' verse 34 (Arberry, The Koran, p. 211).

Doesn't the Islamic obligation to pay tithes, an obligation on the rich to share their wealth with the poor, essentially correspond to the sharing of wealth required by Marxism--of course, to be carried out in the Marxist fashion? Doesn't Islam share the principle of "liberty, equality and fraternity" with the Marxism that many Moslems oppose? Hasn't true Islam already led "all mankind to the fields of liberty, equality and fraternity"? Didn't the Prophet of Islam himself teach equality with the words: "I am only a mortal, the like of you; it is revealed to me that your God is One God."<sup>34</sup> Isn't it fraternity which is commanded by verse 13 of the *surah* Al-Hudjarat, which reads: "O mankind, We have created you male and female, and appointed you races and tribes, that you may know one another."<sup>35</sup> Isn't it true that fraternity should not remain merely "fraternity in theory," and that this is acknowledged by non-Moslems too? Isn't it a pity that some Moslems are hostile to a movement whose principles are also "liberty, equality and fraternity"?

I hope that those Moslems who refuse to ally themselves with the Marxists will remember that their movement, like the Marxist movement, is an echo or a reverberation of the agony of the Indonesian people, whose lives are becoming harder and harder, whose existence is growing ever more bitter. They should remember that there is wide congruence in the ideals and great similarity in the demands of their movement and that of the Marxists. They should follow the example of the envoy of the Islamic Kingdom of Afghanistan, who, when asked his views by a Marxist newspaper, replied that though he himself was not a Marxist, he admitted to being a "true friend" of the Marxists, since he was a bitter enemy of European capitalism in Asia!<sup>36</sup>

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34. Koran, surah on 'The Cave,' verse 110 (Arberry, The Koran, p. 328).

35. Koran, surah on 'Apartments,' verse 13 (Arberry, The Koran, p. 232).

36. Cf. Stoddard, New World of Islam, p. 340: "For example, the head of the Afghan mission to Moscow thus frankly expressed his reasons for friendship with Soviet Russia, in an interview printed by the official Soviet organ, Izvestia: 'I am neither Communist nor Socialist, but my political programme so far is the expulsion of the English from Asia. I am an irreconcilable enemy of European capitalism in Asia, the chief representatives of which are the English. On this point I coincide with the Communists and in this respect we are your natural allies. . . .'"

What a pity it will be if the Islamic movement in Indonesia remains hostile towards the Marxist movement. We have never had movements in Indonesia which have been such genuinely people's movements as the Islamic and Marxist movements! We have never had movements which have shaken the people to their marrow as these two movements have done. How tremendous it would be if these two movements, which have become an essential part of the people's everyday existence, could flow together to form one mighty torrent! Happy are those Moslems who have seen the light and who are willing to unite! Happy are they, for they are truly carrying out the commandments of their religion!

As for those Moslems who refuse to unite and who believe that their attitude is right, alas, I only hope they can justify it before God!

### Marxism

At the sound of this word, I see in my mind's eye throngs of suffering people from every nation and country, with wan faces and thin bodies, clothed in rags; I see before me the defender and champion of these suffering masses, a philosopher whose steadfast heart and consciousness of his inner strength "remind me of the invincible, superhuman heroes of ancient German legend," a "colossal" figure who is rightly called the "Grand Master" of the labor movement: Heinrich Karl Marx.

From his earliest youth until the day of his death, this extraordinary man never ceased to defend the poor, to show them the reasons for their misery, and to prove to them that victory would certainly be theirs in the end. Never downhearted, never tired, he labored in their defense: he was sitting in a chair in front of his desk, when he drew his last breath in 1883.

It is as if I can hear his voice resounding like thunder around the world, as he made his appeal in 1847: "Workingmen of all countries, unite!" And indeed, history offers no example of a man whose ideas have so rapidly commanded the acceptance of a social group as have the views of this champion of the laboring masses. From tens to hundreds, from hundreds to thousands, from thousands to ten thousands, to hundreds of thousands, to millions: so his followers have increased! For although his theories are "difficult" for clever intellectuals, "he can easily be understood by the wretched and oppressed, by the poor whose thoughts are full of their misery."

Unlike the other socialists, who believed that their ideals could be realized through friendship between workers and employers, unlike, for example, Ferdinand Lassalle whose cry was a cry of peace,<sup>37</sup> Karl Marx in his writings never once touched on the subject of love or friendship; rather he set forth a concept of struggle between groups, a concept of class struggle. He taught that the liberation of the workers would only come about through relentless struggle against the bourgeoisie, a struggle made inevitable by the very existence of the capitalist order.

Although my readers surely all know a little of Marx's teachings, it may be useful to remind them here of some of his achievements as a philosopher: he undertook a study of the process of thought based on materialism (Dialectical Materialism); he put forward the theory that the value of commodities is determined by the quantity of work required to produce them, in other words that work is the *wertbildende Substanz*, the value-creating substance of commodities (the labor theory of value); he developed the idea that the value created by the workers in the production of commodities is greater than what they receive in the form of wages (surplus value); he carried out a study of history based on materialism, teaching that "it is not consciousness which determines objective conditions; on the contrary, objective conditions with regard to social relations determine consciousness" (the materialist conception of history); he expounded the theory that because surplus value is transformed into capital, over time the concentration of capital becomes greater and greater (accumulation of capital) as small capital holdings are consolidated into larger units (centralization of capital). Because of competition, small enterprises are squeezed out by larger enterprises until ultimately only a few giant enterprises are left (concentration of capital); and he argued that under the capitalist order the lot of the workers becomes increasingly miserable, while their hatred for this order becomes increasingly violent (the theory of increasing misery). These are his main theoretical achievements; lack of space prevents me from giving any fuller explanation to readers not yet familiar with them.

Although his enemies, among them the anarchists, deny these achievements of Marx; although as early as 1825, Adolphe

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37. Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) was the main architect of the German labor movement after 1848 and one of the founders of the German Social Democratic Party. His tactical support of Bismarck against the German liberals aroused the hostility of many on the left. He was a major antagonist of Marx.



Blanqui<sup>38</sup> used the historical materialist method in stating that history "determines events," while economics "explains the causes of events"; although the theory of surplus value had originated earlier with such thinkers as Sismondi, Thompson and others;<sup>39</sup> although his theory of capital concentration and the labor theory of value contain elements which cannot be defended against the criticisms of his opponents, who indefatigably search for weaknesses; despite all this, it is unquestionable that the system of Karl Marx has no little significance in its general outline, and is of vast importance in some of its specific features. It is also unquestionable that although these theories originated in part with earlier thinkers, it was Marx who, despite the fact that his language is difficult and obscure to the upper class, elucidated these theories with great clarity, so that they can easily be grasped by the "wretched and oppressed" and their champions. Such people immediately comprehend his theory of surplus value without any difficulty--indeed they see it as a self-evident truth. They know very well that their employers get rich quickly because they do not turn over to them the whole product of their labor. They immediately understand that economic conditions and structures are the factors that determine a man's character, his intelligence, his religious beliefs, etc. They know that *er ist was er isst*.<sup>40</sup> They see at once that capitalism will certainly be destroyed in the end, that it will inevitably disappear and be replaced by a juster social order, and that what "the bourgeoisie" "are producing, above all, are their own grave-diggers."<sup>41</sup>

These deep and difficult theories have penetrated the workers to the core, both in Europe and America. "Is it not

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38. Jérôme Adolphe Blanqui (1798-1854) was a French economist whose History of Political Economy in Europe was the first major study of the history of economic thought.
  39. Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi (1773-1842), the liberal Genevan historian and economist, was one of the founders of modern economic thought. It is not clear which Thompson Sukarno has in mind.
  40. The Indonesian text has *er ist was er ist* (man is what he is); presumably this is a typographical error, since the sense of the previous sentence suggests that Sukarno is aware that Feuerbach's famous axiom (Mann ist was er isst) means 'man is what he eats.'
  41. The phrase is quoted from The Communist Manifesto.

miraculous indeed that this belief has now established itself in the hearts of millions, and that there is no power on earth which can eradicate it?" Like seeds scattered in all directions by the wind, which sprout wherever they fall, the seeds of Marxism have taken root and are sending up shoots; everywhere the bourgeoisie are preparing themselves and trying to crush the "proletarian threat," a plant that grows stronger day by day. Some of the seeds scattered through Europe have been carried by the cyclone of our times towards the equator . . . and on to the East where they are dropping down and sprouting up among the hills and mountains which extend throughout the "emerald belt," the archipelago whose name is Indonesia. Every day the air in the West quivers with the sound of the "Internationale" and the reverberations are so great that they echo and resound as far as the East.

The Marxist movement in Indonesia has been characterized by hostility towards movements with a Nationalist orientation and hostility towards movements based on Islamic principles. Indeed some years ago this hostility broke out in a quarrel over conflicting beliefs, a quarrel over conflicting attitudes, a quarrel between brothers, a quarrel, which, as I have previously explained, discouraged and disheartened all those who gave first priority to harmony, all those who understood that in this kind of conflict lies defeat. Bury nationalism, bury the politics of love of country, abolish the politics of religion! Such, more or less, was the battle cry one heard. They would say: Didn't Marx and Engels state that "the workers have no fatherland"? Isn't it written in *The Communist Manifesto* that "communism abolishes religion"? Didn't Bebel declare that "It was not God who created man, but rather man who created God"?<sup>42</sup>

On the other hand, the Nationalist and Moslem groups never tired of abusing the Marxists, denouncing their movement as being "in league" with foreigners, and as "denying" the existence of God. They poured scorn on the movement as taking its lead from Russia, which, in their view, was totally bankrupt and had proved incapable of putting its utopian ideals into effect. They ridiculed these ideals as the cause of the anarchy, famine and disease which claimed the lives of approximately fifteen million people, a figure greater than the total number of persons killed in the recent world war.

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42. August Bebel (1840-1913), co-founder of the German Social Democratic Party and its most popular leader for forty years, was a close friend of Engels and Liebknecht and a strong opponent of Lassalle and Bismarck.

So the quarrel stood some years ago--with growing mutual recriminations between the leaders of these movements, growing mutual misunderstanding and growing mutual avoidance.

But the new Marxist tactics do not reject cooperation with Moslems and Nationalists in Asia. As a matter of fact, they call for the support of genuine Nationalist and Islamic movements. Those Marxists who are still hostile to militant Nationalist and Islamic movements in Asia have not adjusted to the new times and do not understand that Marxist tactics have changed accordingly.

Again, however, those Nationalists and Moslems who denounce the "bankruptcy" of Marxist concepts and point to anarchy and famine as the result of "applying" Marxist concepts, show that they do not understand these concepts and that they have failed to grasp the real reasons for the setbacks in their "application." Does not Marxism itself teach that socialism can only be fully realized when all the major states have been "socialized"?

Doesn't the present situation differ radically from the pre-conditions required for the fulfillment of Marxist goals?

To be fair in judging the "application" of Marxist concepts, we must remember that "bankruptcy" and "anarchy" in Russia have been accelerated by the blockade imposed by her enemies; that they have been aggravated by the attacks launched against her in fourteen places by hostile powers such as England and France, as well as by Generals Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch and Wrangel;<sup>43</sup> and that the situation was further worsened by the venomous propaganda directed against her by almost every newspaper in the world.

In my opinion, her enemies must be held equally responsible for the death of fifteen million sick and starving people, since they supported the attacks of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch and Wrangel with money and supplies. The same England which spent millions to support attacks on her former ally "defiled the name of England before the whole world by refusing to give any assistance to relief-work" among the sick and hungry. At the time this catastrophe occurred, America, Rumania and Hungary had wheat surpluses so great that the grain was used for fuel, while in Russia, in the district of Samara, people were eating the flesh of their own children to stave off famine.

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43. These men were the top military leaders of the Whites in the Russian Civil War.

One can only respect the impartial verdict of H. G. Wells, a distinguished British author and by no means a Communist, who wrote that if the Bolsheviks "had not been incessantly harassed, perhaps they would have been able to complete an experiment of the greatest value to mankind. . . . But they were incessantly harassed!"

I am not a Communist, I favor no side! I only favor Unity--Indonesian Unity--and friendship between all our different movements.

I mentioned earlier that contemporary Marxist tactics are different from those of the past. The old tactical stance, which was violently anti-nationalist and anti-religious, especially in Asia, has changed radically: what was once bitter hostility has become friendship and support. We can today see friendship between Marxists and Nationalists in China, and between Marxists and Moslems in Afghanistan.<sup>44</sup>

Marxist theory has also changed, and so it should. Marx and Engels were not prophets who could establish systems applicable for all time. Their theories have to be modified with changing conditions; their concepts must be adapted to a changing world if they are not to become bankrupt. Marx and Engels themselves understood this very well. In their writings they often noted changes in their views in accordance with the objective changes taking place at the time they lived. Compare their views of 1847, compare, for example, their interpretations of the term *Verelendung* (increasing misery) in *The Communist Manifesto* and in *Das Kapital*! The change in conception, or the change in emphasis is immediately obvious. The social democrat Emile Vandervelde was perfectly correct when he stated that "revisionism did not begin with Bernstein, but with Marx and Engels themselves."<sup>45</sup>

These changes in theory and tactics account for the support given to genuine nationalist movements, especially in

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44. It should perhaps be pointed out that the friendship between Marxists and Moslems in Afghanistan, to which Sukarno here refers, was not internal political cooperation between Afghan Marxist and Islamic groups, but an external alliance between Kabul and Moscow which resulted from the anti-British and pro-Russian policies of the Afghan ruler Amanullah Khan after 1919.
  45. Emile Vandervelde (1866-1938), one of the best known socialists of his day, led the Belgian Workers' Party from 1890 onwards. He was notable for his genuine internationalism, humanitarianism, and anti-militarism.

Asia, by the newer Marxists, whether of the "moderate" or "militant" variety. They understand that in the countries of Asia, where no proletariat as yet exists in the European or American sense, their movement must be adapted to the characteristic features of Asian society. They understand that the Marxist movement in Asia must employ different tactics from those used by the Marxist movement in Europe or America,<sup>46</sup> and must "cooperate with the 'petty-bourgeois' parties, because here the main objective is not power, but the struggle against feudalism."

For the workers in Asian countries to be able to have the freedom to build true socialist movements, these countries must be free, must possess national autonomy. "National autonomy is an objective for which the proletarian struggle must aim, because it is an essential precondition for pursuing its ultimate goals," says Otto Bauer. This is why national autonomy constitutes one of the very first priorities for the workers' movements in Asia. This is why the workers of Asia must cooperate with and support all movements which are fighting for national autonomy, irrespective of the principles which they embrace. This is also why the Marxist movement in Indonesia must support our Nationalist and Islamic movements, which have made this autonomy their goal.

Marxists must remember that their movement cannot help but arouse feelings of Nationalism in the hearts of Indonesian workers, since most capital in Indonesia is foreign capital. Furthermore, the very nature of their movement--opposition to capital--stirs up feelings of discontent in the hearts of the workers, who are "at the bottom," against the people "at the top," and stimulates support for a politics of national power of the people themselves. Marxists must bear in mind that the feeling of internationalism is certainly not as strong in Indonesia as it is in Europe. Indonesian workers have absorbed the concept of internationalism primarily as a matter of tactics. Moreover, the Indonesian people's attachment to their native soil and their very limited financial resources have meant that only a few determined people have been willing to leave Indonesia in search of work in other countries, with the conviction that *ubi bene, ibi patria* (where conditions are good, there is my country)--unlike the worker in Europe who has become a

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46. The text actually reads 'or Asia,' but this makes no sense here. The translators have taken the liberty of substituting the words 'or America,' which seem to fit the context better.

man without a permanent home and without a permanent fatherland.

If they keep all this in mind, the Marxists will surely see the error of fighting the nationalist movements of their own people. They will surely recall the examples of Marxist leaders in other countries who have cooperated with the nationalists; they will surely think of the Marxist leaders in China who gladly support the efforts of the Nationalists because they are aware that China's prime need is for national unity and national independence.

Along this same line, it is a mistake for Marxists to be at loggerheads with a genuine Islamic movement. It is quite inappropriate for them to attack a movement which, as I have already pointed out, takes an openly anti-capitalist position. It is incorrect for them to attack a movement which clearly condemns usury, interest and surplus value. It is misguided of them to attack a movement which explicitly pursues the goals of liberty, equality and fraternity, which explicitly pursues national autonomy. And the reason why it is a mistake to take such positions is that the new Marxist tactics towards religion are quite different from the old. The new Marxism is quite different from the Marxism of 1847, which, through *The Communist Manifesto*, declared that religion must be abolished.

We must distinguish Historical Materialism from Philosophical Materialism; and we must remind ourselves that the purpose of the former is different from that of the latter. Philosophical Materialism addresses the question: what is the relationship between thought and matter, how does thought arise? Historical Materialism answers the question of why thought in any given period has such and such characteristics. Philosophical Materialism poses questions about the existence of thought; Historical Materialism asks why thought changes. Philosophical Materialism seeks the origin of thought; Historical Materialism studies its development. Philosophical Materialism is philosophical; Historical Materialism is historical.

These two concepts are constantly being confused and confounded with each other by the enemies of Marxism in Europe, especially by the churches. In their anti-Marxist propaganda, they assiduously mix up these two perspectives and accuse Marxists of teaching that thought is simply the product of the brain, just as spittle is the product of the mouth, and bile is the product of the spleen. They never stop calling Marxists worshippers of things, or people whose God is Matter.



This is the origin of the European Marxists' hatred for the churches, the origin of their hostility to religious groups. Their hostility has become all the more bitter, their hatred has become all the more violent as the religious groups have used their religion for the protection of capitalism, have exploited their religion to defend the interests of the ruling class, and have manipulated their religion to pursue ultra-reactionary policies.

This hatred for religious groups, which has its origins in the reactionary attitude of the churches, has been turned by the Marxists against the Moslems, who have a very different attitude and completely different characteristics from the religious groups in Europe! Here Islam is the religion of the enslaved, here Islam is the religion of the masses "at the bottom." By contrast, there the Christians are the free, there the Christians are the people "on top." Inevitably a religion that is anti-capitalist, a religion of the enslaved, a religion of the masses "at the bottom," a religion that demands the quest for freedom, a religion that forbids the existence of people "at the bottom"--a religion of this kind will unquestionably create attitudes which are not reactionary, and will undoubtedly generate a struggle which in several respects is identical with the struggle of the Marxists.

Therefore, if Marxists will remind themselves of the differences between the churches in Europe and Islam in Indonesia, they will surely stretch out their hands and say: "Brother, let us be one." If they value the examples of their comrades who are cooperating with Moslems in other countries, they will surely follow these examples. And if they also cooperate with the Nationalists, they can declare in all serenity: "We have done our duty."

By fulfilling the duties imposed by the new Marxism, by taking into account all the necessary changes in basic theory, and by carrying out all the necessary changes in tactics, they can call themselves true and sincere defenders of the people--they can really call themselves the salt of the earth.

But as for the Marxists who oppose unity, the Marxists who are conservative in their theory and out of date in their tactics, the Marxists who oppose genuine Nationalist and Islamic movements, such Marxists should not feel insulted if they are called the bane of the people.

This article is now almost at an end.

I have tried to show, in however imperfect a manner, that, in the colonized countries, the concepts of Nationalism, Islam and Marxism coincide in several respects. However



inadequately, I have tried to point to examples of leaders in other countries. But I am convinced that I have demonstrated very clearly my desire for unity. I am certain that all Indonesian leaders are aware that only Unity will lead us to Greatness and Independence. I am further persuaded that although my thoughts may not meet all the wishes of every group, they do show that Unity can be attained. It only remains now to create an organization which can realize this Unity; it only remains to look for an organizer who can make himself the Mahatma of this Unity. Does not Mother Indonesia, who has such sons as Umar Said Tjokroaminoto, Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Semaun<sup>47</sup>--does not Mother Indonesia also have a son who can become the Champion of this Unity?

We must be prepared to receive, but we must also be ready to give. This is the secret of Unity. Unity cannot exist if each group does not give a little.

If we keep in mind that the strength of life lies not in receiving, but in giving; if we keep in mind that in discord lies the seed of our enslavement; if we keep in mind that mutual hostility is the origin of our 'via dolorosa'; if we keep in mind that the Spirit of Our People is still strong enough to lift itself up towards the One ray of Light shining in the midst of the darkness that surrounds us--then surely Unity will be achieved, surely the ray of Light will be reached. For the Light is near.

*Suluh Indonesia Muda, 1926*

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47. Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo (1889-1943) was among the most eminent and respected nationalists of the pre-Sukarno generation. He had helped found the Indische Partij in 1912, together with Douwes Dekker and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. He was Sukarno's chief political mentor during the latter's student days in Bandung (1921-1926). Semaun (1899- ), an exact contemporary of Sukarno, was the most prominent member of the earliest group of Indonesian Marxists and was the first chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, when it was formed in May 1920.