




Cyber Troops


Masjid IKHTIAR
Perdos UNHAS Tamalanrea

Oktober
2019

DEFINISI



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The Global Disinformation Order 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation

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Cyber troops are defined as
government or political party
actors tasked with
manipulating public opinion
online

(Bradshaw and Howard 2017a).


Although propaganda has always been a part of political discourse, the deep and wide-ranging scope of these campaigns raise critical public interest concerns.

Cyber troops' are defined as government or political party actors tasked with manipulating public opinion online (Bradshaw and Howard 2017a). We comparatively examine the formal organization of cyber troops around the world, and how these actors use computational propaganda for political purposes. This involves building an inventory of the evolving strategies, tools, and techniques of computational propaganda, including the use of 'political bots' to amplify hate speech or other forms of manipulated content, the illegal harvesting of data or micro-targeting, or deploying an army of 'trolls' to bully or harass political dissidents or journalists online. We also track the capacity and resources invested into developing these techniques to build a picture of cyber troop capabilities around the world.

The use of computational propaganda to shape public attitudes via social media has become mainstream, extending far beyond the actions of a few bad actors. In an information environment characterized by high volumes of information and limited levels of user attention and trust, the tools and techniques of computational propaganda are becoming a common – and arguably essential – part of digital campaigning and public diplomacy. In addition to building a globally comparative picture of cyber troop activity, we also hope to drive public and scholarly debate about how we define and understand the changing

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Executive Summary

Computational propaganda – the use of algorithms, automation, and big data to shape public life – is becoming a pervasive and ubiquitous part of everyday life.

Over the past three years, we have monitored the global organization of social media manipulation by governments and political parties. Our 2019 report analyses the trends of computational propaganda and the evolving tools, capacities, strategies, and resources.


1. Evidence of organized social media manipulation campaigns which have taken place in 70 countries, up from 48 countries in 2018 and 28 countries in 2017. In each country, there is at least one political party or government agency using social media to shape public attitudes domestically (Figure 1).
2. Social media has become co-opted by many authoritarian regimes. In 26 countries, computational propaganda is being used as a tool of information control in three distinct ways: to suppress fundamental human rights, discredit political opponents, and drown out dissenting opinions (Figure 2).
3. A handful of sophisticated state actors use computational propaganda for foreign influence operations. Facebook and Twitter attributed foreign influence operations to seven countries (China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) who have used these platforms to influence global audiences (Figure 3).
4. China has become a major player in the global disinformation order. Until the 2019 protests in Hong Kong, most evidence of Chinese computational propaganda occurred on domestic platforms such as Weibo, WeChat, and QQ. But China's new-found interest in aggressively using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube should raise concerns for democracies.
5. Despite there being more social networking platforms than ever, Facebook remains the platform of choice for social media manipulation. In 56 countries, we found evidence of formally organized computational propaganda campaigns on Facebook. (Figure 4).



Report Methodology

The methodology for this report consists of four stages:

1. a systematic content analysis of news articles reporting on cyber troop activity;
2. a secondary literature review of public archives and scientific reports;
3. drafting country case studies; and
4. expert consultations.






FIGURE 1 - THE GLOBAL DISINFORMATION ORDER
COUNTRIES TAKING PART IN SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION



FIGURE 2 - COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA AS A TOOL OF INFORMATION CONTROL
AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES DEPLOYING COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA



FIGURE 3 - FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
COUNTRIES ATTRIBUTED BY FACEBOOK AND TWITTER FOR ENGAGING IN FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS



Source: Authors' evaluations based on data collected. **Note:** Facebook has also taken down accounts engaged in 'coordinated inauthentic behaviour' that are not explicitly linked to a government or political party. These takedowns include accounts originating from: Egypt, Macedonia, Kosovo, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, some cyber troop activity identified by Facebook and Twitter is domestically focused, such as in the case of Bangladesh and Honduras, and is therefore not included in this figure on foreign operations.

TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY






























HIGH CAPACITY		
Country	Status	Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending
 China	Permanent	Team size estimates of 300,000-2,000,000 people working in local and regional offices
 Egypt	Permanent	-
 Iran	Permanent	6,000 USD spent on FB advertisements
 Israel	Permanent	Team size estimates of 400 people. Evidence of Formal Training. Multiple contracts valued at 778K USD and 100M USD.
 Myanmar	Permanent	Evidence of Formal Training in Russia
 Russia	Permanent	-
 Saudi Arabia	Permanent	Estimated costs of 150 Pounds for Twitter Hashtag Trends
 Syria	Permanent	Multiple Contracts valued at 4,000 USD
 United Arab Emirates	Permanent	Multiple Expenditures valued at over 10M USD
 United States	Permanent & Temporary	-
 Venezuela	Permanent	Team size estimates of multiple brigades of 500 people. Evidence of Formal Training
 Vietnam	Permanent & Temporary	Team size estimates of 10,000 people

TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY continued

LOW CAPACITY		
Country	Status	Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending
 Austria	Temporary	-
 Colombia	Temporary	-
 Czech Republic	Temporary	-
 Eritrea	Permanent	-
 Germany	Temporary	-
 Honduras	Temporary	-
 Hungary	Temporary	-
 Indonesia	Temporary	Multiple contracts valued between 1M-50M Rupias
 Italy	Temporary	-
 Kenya	Temporary	One contract with Cambridge Analytica valued at 6M USD
 Macedonia	Temporary	-
 Moldova	Temporary	20,000USD spent on Facebook and Instagram Ads
 Nigeria	Temporary	One contract with Cambridge Analytica Valued at 2.8M USD
 North Korea	Permanent	Team size estimates of 200 people
 Poland	Temporary	-
 Rwanda	Temporary	-
 Serbia	Permanent	Salary Estimates valued at 370 EURO/month
South Africa	Temporary	Multiple contracts valued at 2M USD
Spain	Temporary	-
Zimbabwe	Temporary	-